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Preface
This is the report for the master’s thesis Methods for determining PFD/SIL for workover control
systems with short test-intervals and imperfect testing. The master’s thesis has been written at
the Department of Production and Quality Engineering(IPK) at the Norwegian University of Sci-
ence and Technology(NTNU). The thesis is part of the two-year international master’s degree
programme, MSc in Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety.
The master’s thesis has been carried out under the supervision of Professor Mary Ann
Lundteigen at the IPK Department at NTNU, and supervision of Stein Hauge, senior scientist
at the Department of Safety Research at SINTEF.
The reader ought to have some knowledge on probability theory, methods for reliability
assessment of safety systems, logic and algorithms. Moreover, it is highly recommended that
the reader has familiarity with the standards IEC 61508, IEC 61511 and ISO 13628-7, and the
PDS method.
Trondheim, 2014-06-05
Wilmer Alberto Aguilar Martínez
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Executive Summary
Safety related-systems are subject to periodic proof testing, and it is often assumed that the
proof test is perfect. In recent years, partial proof testing has been introduced in order to im-
prove the system’s reliability, and partial proof testing is often referred as imperfect proof testing.
In this master’s thesis we show that partial proof testing is different from imperfect proof testing,
and, a mathematical model for modelling the effect of both partial and imperfect proof testing
is proposed.
In addition to imperfect and partial proof tests, the system can also be subject to proof test-
ing with short test intervals (intervals in the order of two or three weeks). In theory, a system that
is subject to short test intervals is highly reliable, however, there are some factors like (i)human
errors that are introduced during proof testing, and (ii)wear, that impact the system’s reliability.
We present and discuss the major contributors to the unreliability of a system, which is often
known as the system’s unavailability.
In this master’s thesis we study four reliability assessment methods for estimating the prob-
ability of failure on Demand, PFDavg of safety-related systems that are subject to partial and
imperfect proof testing. In addition, the effects of short test intervals are also studied.
Additional factors that contribute to high reliability of a system during the system’s life cycle
are discussed and highlighted.
A Workover Control System functions as a safety barrier during workover and intervention
operations for subsea production wells. In addition to partial and imperfect proof testing, this
type of system is also subject to proof testing with short test intervals. This system is used as
a case study to illustrate the use of the proposed model and to discuss the effects partial and
imperfect proof testing.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Safety related systems are systems that carry out safety functions in order to prevent hazardous
events. These type of systems normally operate in one of the following modes: (i)low demand
mode, (ii)high demand mode, and (iii)continuous mode. Each mode is characterized for the
frequency of demand (see for example, part 4 IEC61508, 2010).
Given that a safety-related system carries out safety functions that are only required during a
hazardous event, the system has to be tested periodically in order to reveal hidden failures that
may be introduced while the safety functions are passive. A system operating in low demand
mode is often tested with an average frequency of one year. However, there are some safety
systems that are tested with very short intervals (for example, less than one month).
In most cases, it is assumed that a proof test is perfect, meaning that all hidden failures
are revealed. This assumption is seldom realistic, since a proof test differs from a real demand
and some functions may be impossible to test due to potential damage or wear out of the final
elements. In this case, the proof test is imperfect. In addition, the proof tests may be performed
partially, meaning that just a fraction of the testable capabilities of the system are tested. The
limitations of the partial proof tests may prevent us from revealing all possible hidden failures.
Imperfect proof testing differs from partial proof testing in the sense that a partial proof
test is intentionally partial, whereas the degree of imperfection of a proof test is an inherent
characteristic of the test itself. Therefore, we refer to imperfect proof tests as full proof tests
that by nature are imperfect; on the other hand, we refer to partial proof tests as tests with the
intention to reveal only a predefined fraction of hidden failures.
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In addition to short test intervals, we can see that a system may be subject to partial and
imperfect proof tests.
A WorkOver Control System(WOCS) is a safety-related system operating in low demand
mode that is used to control equipment during intervention of subsea wells, and to function as a
safety barrier to prevent hazardous events(e.g., release of hydrocarbons) during WorkOver(WO)
operations. Due to the requirements for the WOCS to function as a safety barrier, it is necessary
to demonstrate that this system meets the specified safety requirements in order to obtain the
required risk reduction. On the Norwegian continental shelf it has been determined to carry
out proof tests to this system every 14 days (a short test interval). In addition, the WOCS has
components that are subject to imperfect proof test (e.g., a Shear Seal RAM).
From the literature review we conclude that few mathematical models have been developed
to consider the effect of short tests intervals to the system’s reliability. The reader may (mainly)
find brief discussions of the effects of too frequent proof tests (see e.g., Voronov and Alzbutas,
2009; NEA/CSNI/R, 2002; Chowhury and Varde, 2011).
Limited literature is available on the topic of how to model the effects of partial and imper-
fect proof tests. The effects of non-perfect (imperfect) proof tests are briefly discussed by the
standard IEC61508-61 and the concept of proof test coverage is introduced for modelling this
issue. The practice of partial stroke testing of shutdown valves(as cite in Lundteigen and Rau-
sand, 2008) has led to the concept of partial proof testing, and it is often referred as an imperfect
proof testing (see e.g., Hauge et al., 2013).
Two main approaches are available for modelling the effects of partial or imperfect proof
tests: (i) using the proof test coverage factor to split the failure rate into failure rate tested only
by perfect proof tests and failure rate tested by partial proof test and also by perfect proof tests.
(see e.g., Jin and Rausand, 2014; Brissaud et al., 2012; Oliveira, 2009; Hauge et al., 2013), and (ii)
adding a constant contribution in order to compensate failures that are not revealed by a proof
test (Hauge et al., 2013). In both cases, a perfect proof test takes place at some point in time.
In this master’s thesis we propose a mathematical model for modelling the effect of partial
and imperfect proof tests to system’s reliability. The proof test coverage factor is essential for
modelling the effects of partial and imperfect proof testing. The reader may find a detailed ap-
1The reader is referenced to section B.3.2.5, IEC61508-6
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proach developed by (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2008) for estimating the test coverage factor for
partial proof tests of shutdown valves. We extend and simplify this approach for estimating the
coverage factor for modelling partial proof tests of any component. The procedure for estimat-
ing the coverage factor is based on the use of the Failure, Modes, and Effects Analysis(FMEA).
We introduce the concept of maximum test coverage factor for modelling the effect of im-
perfect proof tests. With two coverage factors, we propose a model for calculating the time-
dependent availability of components that are subject to partial and imperfect proof tests. This
model is used for computing the PFDavg of a system by applying standard methods for reliability
analysis: (i)The structure function of reliability block diagrams, (ii)Formulae derived from Fault
Tree Analysis, (iii) A Boolean approach by using Fault Trees. In addition, Petri Net models for
modelling the effect of partial and imperfect proof tests are presented.
When considering the effect of short test intervals to system’s reliability, the mathematical
models should be different from those ones that are derived under the assumption that the fail-
ure rate is constant, mainly because too frequent proof testing leads to wear and therefore in-
creased probability of failure. Mathematical expressions derived under the assumption that the
failure rate is Weibull-distributed (e.g., λ increases over time, α> 1) seems to be a more proper
approach. Nonetheless, we assume that the failure rate remains constant over the lifetime of
the system, but the proof test interval needs to have the proper length (optimum test interval)
in such way that risk reducing criteria is still met. This optimum test interval can be found by op-
timizing the analytical unavailability function that depends on the test interval τ. It is possible
only if the major contributors to the safety unavailability are quantified.
Along with the development of the new approaches, we also discuss (i)the factors that leads
to high reliability, when considering design properties as well as the way of operating and main-
taining a safety related system, (ii)the main relationship between test intervals and system re-
liability, and (iii) how safety functions and control functions affects the safety integrity level of
safety-related systems
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1.1 Limitations
The study under consideration is limited to the regulations and recommendations for safety-
related systems used on the Norwegian continental shelf. For example, NORSOK-D010 (2013)
recommends rigorous requirements with respect to test frequency of subsea equipment.
The optimum test interval found by optimizing the analytical unavailability function can
be used for estimating the minimum related cost due to maintenance activities. However, cost
analysis is beyond the scope of this master’s thesis. We briefly discuss this issue by presenting
the cost function and the use of the optimum test interval.
Modelling the effect of Common Cause Failures(CCFs) to the PFDavg is not covered. How-
ever, CCFs are easily included by using the standard beta factor model, or the modified beta
factor approach proposed in the PDS method (see e.g., Hauge et al., 2013).
Reliability data and exhaustive analysis of the failure modes of the components involved
for the development of the system functions of the WOCS are essential for calculations of the
PFDavg. We assume that the reliability data is exponentially distributed, that the failure rates of
the different failure modes of a component are independent, and when we do not find reliability
data due to limited information available in the databases (OREDA, 2009b,a; Hauge and Onshus,
2013), we assume some values for failure rates.
1.2 Research Approach
In order to succeed in the development of this master’s thesis, the following factors were con-
sidered:
Planning
During the first three weeks of this project, we worked on the understanding of the stated prob-
lem and how it was going to be treated. This was outlined in the pre-study report attached in
Appendix H. That document served as a management tool towards controlling the development
of this project.
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Supervision
The supervision scheme was established early at the beginning of this project. In agreement
with the supervisors, a meeting every week was planned. Every meeting was arranged to take
place in a studio room, and for controlling the progress of the development of the master’s the-
sis, meeting minutes were documented.
Overall Approach
Understanding the functionality and configuration of a WOCS represented one the first steps in
this project. For this purpose the part 7 of the standard ISO13628 (2005b) was carefully reviewed.
In addition, the knowledge about this system was complemented with information available at
SINTEF.
Feedback from people with experience in the configuration, operation and maintenance of
WOCS was crucial for the understanding the problem. We discussed this topic with the professor
responsible for the course Subsea Production Systems at Petroleum Department at NTNU. In
addition, this topic was also discussed with an engineer responsible for the operation of subsea
wells who works for Statoil. It allowed us to become more confident to work in the solution of
the problem.
For the analysis of the proper methods for the reliability analysis of the WOCS, the technical
report ISO/TR-12489 (2013) was thoroughly reviewed. The standards IEC61508 (2010); IEC61511
(2003) were also examined.
In order to know the state of art on modelling the effect of partial and imperfect proof test-
ing, and the effects of short test intervals to system’s reliability, relevant scientific articles were
reviewed. Some articles have been published by the Journal of Risk and Reliability, the Interna-
tional Journal of Reliability, the Journal Quality and Safety Engineering, the Journal of Reliability
and Safety System and the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. The PDS method
was also of importance for understanding the proper use of the parameters for modelling im-
perfect proof testing.
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Software
The use of software like MATLAB, GRIF and Microsoft Excel were used for calculations. MATLAB
was used for coding the algorithm that computes and draws the time dependent availability of
the safety functions carried out by the WOCS; GRIF was used for simulating the Petri Net models
proposed in this project, and some calculations and plots were developed by using Microsoft
Excel.
This report was written by using Latex.
1.3 Structure of the Report
In the following paragraphs a short description of the chapters of this report is provided.
In chapter 1, we described the context for the problem and the importance of it. We high-
lighted the main aspects to the stated problem that have been studied by other people and the
main activities, and the purpose of this study were introduced. By providing a clear picture of
the problem, the readers find this problem of interest.
In chapter 2, the WOCS is described; it includes the major components, the safety func-
tions, and operational modes. In addition, the design and safety requirements are presented.
The description of the system is essential for the application of the methods for its reliability
assessment.
In chapter 3, findings from the literature review of the work done for modelling the effect of
partial and imperfect proof testing, and the effect of short test intervals are documented. These
three factors are very relevant this master’s thesis, therefore, by knowing the state of the art of
modelling these factors, we make sure that the gaps regarding to the stated problem are clearly
defined and rework is prevented.
In chapter 4, the test coverage factor is explained and a method for estimating the TCF and
TCFmax is proposed. The coverage factors are the main parameters for modelling the effect of
partial and imperfect proof tests.
In chapter 5, four methods for computing the PFDavg are detailed and compared. Different
alternatives are chosen in order to make sure that different approaches can be applied, and to
demonstrate that the results are similar.
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In chapter 6, the main failure modes that may affect a WOCS are discussed. In addition, we
briefly comment on the reliability data available. The FMEA is the cornerstone for estimating
an accurate test coverage factor, therefore, we explain the main failure modes of the WCOS in
order to exemplify its importance and understanding.
In chapter 7, we present the results for the reliability assessment of the WOCS. A method for
reliability assessment is proposed. The method is provided as a guide of the application of the
proposed approaches.
In chapter 8, the major contributors to the unavailability of a safety system are presented in
order to derive a total unavailability function. This function is used for finding the optimum test
interval τ by satisfying the risk reducing criteria.
Finally, in chapter 9, the results of this project are summarized and briefly discussed. The
main conclusions are stated and key points for further work are highlighted.
Chapter 2
System Description
2.1 Introduction
Well intervention in subsea production wells is carried out for several reasons varying from pro-
duction recovery of hydrocarbons to well integrity. Well intervention activities are critical and
therefore requires equipment that ensures safe, reliable and efficient operations. In this chapter,
we present a short description of the equipment for workover operations1 . A short description
of Completion/Workover (C/WO) riser systems is presented. A more detailed description of
Workover Control System (WOCS) is included. The description of WOCS includes: main func-
tions, design and safety requirements, major components, and operational and testing philoso-
phy. This chapter is mainly based on the part 7 of the standard ISO13628 (2005b).
2.2 Completion/Workover System
A Completion/Workover (C/WO) riser is the main system used to re-enter the well through the
subsea tree and run subsea equipment (e.g., a new down hole safety valve) into a wellbore. The
C/WO riser system has typically two operations modes: Tubing hanger mode(through marine
riser) and tree mode(through open sea). The typical operation modes of the C/WO riser systems
that can be carried out with the two types of intervention equipment used, are summarized in
table 2.1. Well completion is to finalise the construction of the well, well intervention-open
1"workover operations" is a term used to describe operations on a completed production well.
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Table 2.1: Typical modes of operation of C/WO riser systems. Adapted from (ISO13628, 2005b)
Typical Operation Tubing Hanger Mode Tree Mode
Well Completion V & H. X-mas tree V. X-mas tree
Well intervention - open Sea NA V & H. X-mas tree
Well intervention - inside drilling riser V & H. X-mas tree NA
Full workover V & H. X-mas tree V. X-mas tree
Note: V stands for Vertical and H stands for Horizontal
sea is the running of the open water workover system, and well intervention -inside drilling
riser is the landing string which is used to run the tubing hanger inside the marine riser. The
Full Workover is to retrieve the tubing hanger and the upper tubing part (cut or sheared out).
The main modules controlled by the WOCS and the typical general arrangement of the main
components of the C/WO riser for the two operational modes are presented in appendix A.
2.2.1 Equipment Under Control
IEC61508-4 defines the Equipment Under Control (EUC) as any apparatus used for process
where risk may arise from this equipment (EUC risk). The Norwegian guidelines NOG-070
(2004) complements the definition of EUC by adding that the EUC is used for diverse operations
and it is a source of hazards. C/WO riser systems are source of hazards during all operations on a
subsea production well; release of hydrocarbons to the environment and blowouts are examples
of undesired events during workover operations. The EUC are all the equipment that contains
flow lines (e.g., the production line) and responds to output signals from the WOCS for pre-
venting the release of hazardous events (e.g., release of hydrocarbons to the environment). The
major equipment that are under control of the WOCS are the X-mas tree, the Lower Riser Pack-
age(LRP), and the Surface Flow Tree(SFT) on the rig. The red dashed line in figure (2.1) shows
the boundary of the EUC. An important point about the EUC boundary is:
The important point will be that the EUC boundaries are clearly defined and in a
manner such that all the relevant hazards to be considered in later lifecycle stages can
be identified and described.
NOG-070 (2004)
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Figure 2.1: Boundary of the Equipment Under Control
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2.3 Workover Control System
A workover control system (WOCS) is a system designed to provide the means to remotely con-
trol and monitor all functions on the (C/WO) riser system. The functions are split into WO op-
eration functions and safety functions. These functions are mainly hydraulic, electric, control
functions, and data acquisition functions. Most actuating elements of a WOCS are hydraulically
operated and parameters like pressure and temperature need to be monitored.
WO operations functions include remote control and monitoring of installation, retrieval,
testing of subsea equipment (e.g., subsea trees, tubing hangers, etc.) and initial well completion
operations and subsequent well workover during the life of the well.
In order to provide a clearer picture of the safety functions that are carried out by a WOCS,
we first present the major components of a WOCS. Safety functions of WOCS are described in
section WOCS Safety Functions.
2.4 WOCS Architecture
The WOCS consists of seven main assemblies plus several miscellaneous and supplemental
assemblies. These main assemblies comprises a high-pressure unit(HPU), a master control
panel(MCP), a remote control panel(RCP), a process shutdown(PSD) panel, an emergency shut-
down(ESD) panel, a workover control module(WCM) and control umbilicals.
2.4.1 High-Pressure Unit
The HPU includes pumps, pressure accumulators, supply and return pipes, flushing, filtering
facilities, supply and control/alarm panel, amongst other elements. The HPU shall be capable to
supply hydraulic power to operate all hydraulically actuated elements in the C/WO riser system,
X-mas tree and the DHSV within the required response times and capacities.
2.4.2 Master Control Panel
The MCP is designed to distribute and supply pressurized hydraulic oil from the HPU. The MCP
shall include a mimic type display featuring the layout of the system and equipment to be oper-
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ated.
2.4.3 Remote Control Panel
The RCP is a control panel based on workstations that are designed to operate PSD, ESD and
emergency quick disconnect (EQD) functions together with other process functions. The RCP
shall be electrically connected to the MCP. The RCP shall operate as a slave to the MCP.
2.4.4 Process Shutdown Panel
The PSD panel is designed to initiate a process shutdown (e.g., the PSD safety function). The
PSD panel shall be electrically connected either to the MCP or to the RCP or to both control
panels.
2.4.5 Emergency Shutdown Panel
The ESD panel is designed to operate PSD, ESD and EQD functions. The ESD panel shall be
electrically connected either to the MCP or to the RCP or to both control panels.
2.4.6 Workover Control Module
The WCM is designed to operate the Lower Riser Package (LRP) in tree mode operation. The
WCM shall have capabilities for controlling the X-mas tree and downhole functions. The WCM
shall be capable of providing feedback to topside system (WOCS on the rig) in order to verify
correct operation. The WCM contains the solenoid valves that allow the flow of hydraulic oil for
closing or opening the valves in the LRP. It also contains the high pressurized accumulators of
hydraulic oil to ensure that the valves close within the required time (e.g., 30 sec).
2.4.7 Control Umbilicals
Umbilical hoses are used to transmit the necessary control and monitoring functions from the
surface controls to the subsea functions. Signal to be transmitted may be both hydraulic and
electrical.
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2.4.8 Other Equipment
Lower Riser Package
The LRP contains the valves for isolating the well (e.g., the Production Isolation Valve, PIV; the
Shear Seal RAM, SS-RAM), the valves for chemical injection (e.g., Inner and Outer chemical
injection valves, ICIV/OCIV), the valves for isolation of the annulus line(e.g., UAIV), and the
crossover valves, IXOV/OXOV, that connect the production line and the annulus for recirculat-
ing hydrocarbons. The LRP acts as a small Blow Out Preventer.
Emergency Disconnect Package-Connector
The EDP-Connector (see figure (2.2) contains the valves that should close to prevent release of
hydrocarbon to the sea in case that the EQD function is carried out. For example, the Riser
Retainer Valve (RRV) isolates the production line and the Riser Annulus Isolation Valve isolates
the annulus line.
Figure 2.2 shows a layout of the WOCS and the modules controlled by the WOCS.
2.5 WOCS Safety Functions
There are three types of safety functions that are carried out for a WOCS. These functions include
ESD, PSD and (EQD) of the marine riser. The EQD function has the highest priority, followed by
the ESD function, and PSD function with the lowest priority.
2.5.1 Process Shutdown Function
The PSD function operates the normally closed Surface Tree Wing Valve (STWV) on the SFT. The
PSD function is activated manually in case of an uncontrolled event on the rig. By opening this
valve, over-pressure in the production line is released safely. See figure 2.2.
Upon activation of 1oon (n > 1) PSD push-buttons, the WOCS’s PLC (installed in the MCP)
reads the change of state of the push-button and sends a signal to the pulse operated hydraulic
valve that operates the STWV. When the pulse operated valve switches, the hydraulic pressure in
the actuator of the STWV is bled off leading the SPWV to the opened position. The PSD function
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Figure 2.3: Reliability Block Diagram for the PSD safety function of the WOCS
is automatically activated when a platform (production) ESD is initiated. Figure 2.3 shows a
simplified reliability block diagram for the PSD safety function.
2.5.2 Emergency Shutdown Function
An ESD consist of a sequential activation of all relevant components (e.g., LRP’s valves) in order
to isolate the well. The barrier element closing sequence considers the presence of coiled tubing
and wireline and whether cutting results in falling or raising of the coiled tubing and wireline.
Successful ESD is obtained by preventing flow either through the production line, the annulus
line or the chemical injection line in the LRP (see figure 2.2) or by closing the DHSV. Two modes
for the ESD function are described: (i) Normal mode which means that the production line
is not obstructed with running tools. (ii) Coiled tubing mode which means that equipment is
being run into the wellbore.
ESD in Normal Mode
The flow through the production line, the annulus line and the chemical injection line is suffi-
ciently prevented if:
1 The valves PIV, 1oo2 CIV, 1oo2 AIV, and the UXOV or 1oo2 LXOV closes sufficiently, or
2 The valves SS-RAM, 1oo2 AIV, and the UXOV or 1oo2 LXOV closes sufficiently, or
3 The DHSV closes sufficiently.
ESD in Coiled Tubing Mode
The flow through the production line, the annulus line and the chemical injection line is suffi-
ciently prevented if:
CHAPTER 2. SYSTEMDESCRIPTION 17
 
Activation 
(Electric) 
 
1oo2 AIV PIV 1oo2 CIV 1oo3 XOV 
DHSV 
SSR 
Power 
Supply 
 
WOCS 
PLC’s 
 
Umbilical 
Figure 2.4: Reliability Block Diagram for the ESD safety function of the WOCS
1 The valves SS-RAM, 1oo2 AIV, and the UXOV or 1oo2 LXOV closes sufficiently.
The PIV and the DHSV are not part of the ESD function in coiled tubing mode given that
these valves do not have cutting capabilities.
NOTE. A valve closes sufficiently if it closes and prevents unintended flow through the line
within a required time.
Figure 2.4 shows a simplified reliability block diagram of the ESD function for both normal
mode and coiled tubing mode. The shadowed area highlights the components that are not part
of the ESD function on coiled tubing mode.
Similarly to the PSD function and EQD function, the ESD function is activated upon activa-
tion of 1oon pushbuttons on the SFT.
2.5.3 Emergency Quick-Disconnect Function
The EDP-Connector shall include the necessary functionality to allow disconnection of the
WO/C riser from the LRP, leaving the well in a safe state with the LRP’s valves closed, in the
event of an emergency situation. The EQD function shall also close the DHSV at defined delay
enabling time for possible removing of intervention equipment that can prevent or damage the
DHSV. The EQD function is normally initiated by pressing one of n available electrical pushbut-
tons (e.g., 1oon) on the rig. Initiating an EQD automatically activates the ESD function, closes
the RRV and RAIV valves and disconnects the marine riser from the LRP.
The RBD comprises the same elements of the ESD function, with exception of the activation
part, because the EQD function has its own activation(electric) subsystem. In addition to those
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elements, the EQD functions is satisfactorily executed if the valves RRV and RAIV in the EDP-
Connector are sufficiently closed. It means that the RBD for the EQD has two additional blocks
in series in the RBD of the ESD.
2.6 Design and Safety Requirements
The standard ISO13628 provides general requirements, recommendations and overall guidance
for development of subsea production systems. ISO13628-7 gives requirements and recommen-
dations for the design, analysis, materials, fabrication, testing and operation of C/WO riser sys-
tems, including WOCSs. A WOCS shall be designed, manufactured and tested in accordance
with2
• Functional requirements: Clause 5 of ISO13528-7.
• Design requirements: Clause 5 of the part 6 of ISO13628. The part 6 of the standard pro-
vides the design requirements for subsea production control systems.
• System integration test: Clause 8 of ISO13238-7.
As a safety-related system, the WOCS shall follow the recommendations provided in the
standard IEC61508 in order to meet a specified reliability and safety performance3. This per-
formance is often measured as the probability that system satisfactorily perform the specified
safety functions under all the stated conditions within a stated period of time. This probability
is known as the safety integrity of a system. (see section 3.5.4, part 4 IEC61508, 2010).
On the Norwegian continental shelf there are no regulatory requirements for the safety in-
tegrity for WOCSs. However, some companies have adapted the recommendations for Blow
Out prevents (BOP) given in the guideline NOG-070, application of the standards IEC61508 and
IEC61511 in the Norwegian petroleum industry. For example, the Statoil governing document
TR0034: Subsea X-mas Tree and Completion/Workover Riser Systems states that a WOCS shall
meet the safety integrity level SIL 2 as given for BOPs in the guideline NOG-070.
2Those items are extracted of table 2, ISO13628-7.
3The specified performance is defined by the user
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The NORSOK standard D-010, Well integrity in drilling and well operations does not specify
any requirements concerning to safety integrity of WO systems, however, it recommends proof
testing every 14 days for well control equipment (e.g., LRP for well intervention) (See e.g., Table
42 NORSOK-D010, 2013).
This requirement of short test intervals impacts the reliability measure of the WOCS. This
issue is discussed later is this document. In addition, general considerations concerning to reli-
ability during the life cycle of the system are also highlighted.
2.6.1 General Safety Requirements
The WOCS is designed to ensure that no single failure will cause an unacceptable risk to person-
nel safety, the environment and to loss of financial assets. A single point failure (e.g., There is no
redundancy) in the control system shall not cause a total system shutdown or prevent the ability
to secure the well, or prevent the execution of the ESD/EQD functions.
The WOCS is designed to perform the emergency shutdown within an acceptable response
time based on a total assessment of the possible emergency situations and the consequences
of such situations. The workover control system is designed so that emergency disconnection
can be carried out within a time interval determined in relation to the development of unfore-
seen situations on the workover vessel after the barriers against blowout have been established.
TR0034 provides response time requirements for the ESD and EQD functions (e.g., 30 seconds
in average).
In the case of an unplanned disconnection, all fail-safe functions shall automatically go to a
safe position (e.g., all valves in the LRP and EDP-Connector shall go to the closed position). Fol-
lowing disconnections, the system shall be designed to minimize ingress of ambient fluids (i.e.
seawater) into the hydraulic control circuits of the disconnected modules (i.e. EDP-connector,
LRP, subsea test tree, etc.).
2.7 Operational and Testing Philosophy
A WO operation is an activity for well intervention that usually does not last more than two or
three weeks and it depends on the demand of this type of activities in the offshore industry. A
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WOCS can be onshore for a couple of months before the WO Operation starts. Before the WO
operation, the WOCS is tested onshore, on the rig and when it is connected to the X-mas tree.
The test include functional testing and pressure integrity testing of all valves(see e.g., clause 11,
part 6 ISO13628, 2005a) .
During a WO operation, most of the valves in the LRP are operated due to operational re-
quirements (e.g., recirculation, chemical injection). Some operators carry out a functional test
of valves (e.g., close and open) without pressure integrity testing every seven days. This is not a
requirement on the standards or governing documents for WO operations and it may be part of
internal policies of some operators. Nonetheless, there exist a requirement to perform pressure
integrity testing of all valves in subsea equipment (e.g., LRP, EDP-Connector, X-mas tree, DHSV)
every 14 days (see e.g., Annex A. NORSOK-D010, 2013). It includes the testing of the function-
ality of all components in the chain for fulfilling the safety functions (e.g., pushbuttons, PLC’s,
HPU, and so on).
After a WO operation, the WOCS is taken to onshore and a maintenance is carried out. It
includes, amongst other activities, exhaustive inspections of all components, change of packing
or sealing devices, functional testing and pressure integrity.
The cutting capabilities of the SS-RAM in the LRP is never tested. This destructive testing is
carried out only for the prototype prior to the production of this component, and it is assumed
that all produced components are an exact "copy" of the SS-RAM that complies with the design
and manufacturing requirements.
The reader may notice that a WOCS has strict maintenance and testing requirements. The
effects of this issues to the reliability of the WOCS are discussed in further paragraphs.
Chapter 3
Literature Review
3.1 Introduction
Proof testing has a crucial bearing on the achievement of the hardware safety integrity of safety-
related systems. Therefore, the proof testing policy adapted to the WOCS is an important aspect
that requires attention in order to understand the effects on the reliability of this system. For in-
stance, it is commonly accepted that frequent proof tests increase the reliability of any systems,
however, there are some factors like wear-out and human errors that have a significant impact in
the reliability measure. For example, the reliability assessment of a WOCS should consider the
effect of short test intervals (requirement of NORSOK-D010 (2013)) to the reliability measure.
In this chapter we present the state of art of modelling the effects of proof tests to the unavail-
ability of safety systems. The effects of (i)different types of proof tests (e.g., perfect proof tests,
imperfect and partial proof tests), and (ii)short test intervals, to system’s reliability are covered
in further detail in this chapter.
In order to gain a comprehensive range of knowledge about the main topics to be covered in
this chapter, some keywords were selected to find the relevant literature on this matter: Logic
combinations of words like proof tests, testing, unavailability, failure on demand, over-testing,
short testing, less testing, reliability, hidden, and revealed were used.
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3.2 Proof Testing
A proof test is a periodic test performed to reveal hidden failures, and to restore or to retain the
safety-related system to as-good-as-new condition. Rausand (2014) introduces a classification
and definition of proof tests of different types.(see also (Aguilar M., 2013)). A proof test may be
full or partial. Both full and partial may be perfect or imperfect. See figure 3.1.
In practice, a proof test is imperfect (Jin et al., 2011) and few approaches are used to model
the effects of the degree of imperfection of proof tests. A proof test is imperfect mainly because
the test conditions deviate from demand conditions and because the proof test is not able to
detect all hidden failures.
A partial proof test is a planned test to reveal a fraction1 the hidden failures. Partial proof
test is becoming a widely accepted technique for reducing the PFDavg of safety-related systems
(Lundteigen and Rausand, 2007, 2008).
Rausand (2014) and Aguilar M. (2013) present and discuss (respectively) some mathematical
models for PFDavg calculations considering the effect of imperfect/partial proof tests of safety
instrumented systems.
Partial proof test may be claimed to be the same as imperfect proof test given that a fraction
of hidden failures are not revealed after a proof test. Concerning partial proof tests, it is decided
to reveal a fraction of hidden failures(hence, it is called partial); on the other hand, for imperfect
proof tests, the fraction of failures that are not revealed is due to the nature of the test itself. It
is clear that the fraction of hidden failures that may be revealed during an imperfect (full) proof
test is closed to 100%, whereas, the fraction of hidden failures that may be revealed during a
partial proof tests is scarcely bigger than 90%.(ACM, 2001; Oliveira, 2009). Under the assumption
that there exist a perfect (full) proof test at some point in time, the mathematical model for
PFDavg calculations is the same when modelling the effects of imperfect (full) proof tests or
partial proof tests.
1This fraction is often estimated based on the knowledge of the system, procedures, etc.
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Figure 3.1: Classification of a Proof Test. Adapted from (Rausand,2014)
3.3 Modelling of imperfect proof testing
As mentioned, limited literature can be found concerning modelling the effects of imperfect
proof test. The effects of imperfect proof tests are modelled by IEC615082 (e.g., see Section
B.3.2.5, part 6 IEC61508, 2010) by introducing the Proof Test Coverage (PTC) as the fraction
of hidden failures that may be revealed by a proof test. The PDS method (Hauge et al., 2013)
presents a more detailed discussion about the effect of imperfect proof tests by examining the
PTC. In addition to the PTC, Hauge et al. (2013) introduces the Probability of test independent
failures, PTIF for modelling the effect of imperfect proof tests. The PDS method also (Hauge
et al., 2013) discusses the suitability of the use of the PTC or the PTIF.
When the coverage factor is used to model partial proof tests and there are hidden failures
that are never tested, and this type of failures are random hardware failures, we shall use two
coverage factors: a Test Coverage Factor, TCF, used to model the effect of partial proof test and a
maximum test coverage factor TCFmax used to model the effect of imperfect full proof tests. TCF
and TCFmax are described in detail in chapter 4. In addition, a step-wise procedure is presented.
The procedure is based on the approach for determining the partial stroke testing coverage fac-
tor for shutdown valves proposed by Lundteigen and Rausand (2008).
Other approaches to model the effect of imperfect are available. Bukowski and Van Beurden
(2009) propose a measure of proof test effectiveness, PTE, that is in indicator of completeness
and correctness of a proof test. This measure is derived from simplified Markov models. Ku-
mar et al. (2008) extends the use of Markov models to incorporate imperfect proof tests. Zhang
et al. (2008) also uses the Markov approach to model imperfect inspections (e.g. proof tests).
2IEC61508-6 refers to imperfect proof test as non-perfect proof test
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However, the complexity of the Markov models increases exponentially with the number of sys-
tems nodes and states (see e.g., Kumar et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2008). Moreover, standard
Markov models should not be used to model such systems that are subject to periodic proof
test (IEC61508-6; ISO/TR-12489, 2013) because of the deterministic test interval. In this case,
the transitions from a failed stated to a working state are not exponentially distributed.
3.4 The Effect of Short Test Intervals
The frequency of proof test intervals is of paramount importance for achieving high hardware
safety integrity, however, very short test intervals are unacceptable for practical reasons with
regard to operation. For example, loss of production due to downtime; Moreover, too frequent
testing have negative impact on reliability due to system degradation (unnecessary wear) and
possible errors of personnel (items that may not have been correctly restored to its operational
mode); In addition, there are also cost related impacts due to the increase of man hours(Vaurio,
1995).
The frequency of testing is mainly chosen by engineering judgment: (i)based on gen-
eral practices (Voronov and Alzbutas, 2009) or (ii)common traditions (Lehtinen et al., 1984).
Nonetheless, when reliability data is available (e.g., failures rates), the selection of the reason-
able level of testing should be treated as an optimization problem. In order to determine the
optimal test strategy, a complete set of information should be gathered (for example, functional
analysis, cost related issues, failure rates, etc.). The analyst (e.g., a reliability engineer) should
consider the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) as the starting point to gather the re-
quired information for the reliability analysis. A brief description of the FMEA is presented in
chapter 4 and the main failures modes that we can affect the reliability of WOCSs are discussed
in chapter 6.
As mentioned in chapter 2, most of the acting elements (e.g., Valves) of a WOCS are func-
tionally tested (e.g., open and close) with a daily basis because of the operating requirements. It
allows the operator to identify which valves are stuck, for example, in the closed position, which
it is a critical failure mode for shutdown valves. However, too frequent strokes leads to wear and
increase the likelihood of damage of seal and/or seat of the valve. We can easily deduce that
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assuming an exponential distribution for the failure rate of those valves leads to unrealistic re-
liability measures. Weibull distribution is a proper probability distribution to model increasing
failure rates.
Mathematically speaking, short test intervals lead to high reliability. See for example the
approximation formulas for PFDavg calculation of safety instrumented systems presented by
Rausand and Høyland (2004). Very low PFDavg corresponds to high safety integrity. However,
that not necessarily means that the systems is highly reliable. This issue is discussed in more
detail in chapter 7.
Very large consequences due to system’s failure may be a good reason for carrying out too
frequent proof testing. However, results from accurate reliability predictions should be the cri-
terion for defining the test interval. Therefore, all factors that influence the system’s reliability
should be considered. The major contributors to safety unavailability are discussed in chapter
8 and the optimization problem is presented.
Chapter 4
Test Coverage Factor
4.1 Introduction
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the proof test coverage (PTC) introduced by IEC61508-6 is used
to model the effect of imperfect and partial proof testing, and partial proof testing is imple-
mented to reduce the unavailability (e.g., PFDavg) of safety systems (Lundteigen and Rausand,
2008). In the literature we find some methods for reliability assessment of safety instrumented
systems subject to partial proof test. See for example, (Jin and Rausand, 2014; Brissaud et al.,
2010; Oliveira, 2009). Those articles cover the application of the coverage factor, but they do not
present details in how to determine it. A procedure for how to determine the partial stroke test-
ing coverage factor is elaborated by (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2008). This approach is limited
to shutdown valves and we extend this method for estimating the test coverage factors(TCF and
TCFmax) of any component that can be partially tested or it is subject to imperfect proof testing.
4.2 Definition and Use of the Test Coverage Factors
The concepts of TCF and TCFmax were briefly introduced in chapter 3. The definition and de-
scription of these two parameters follows
Z TCF: Fraction of hidden failures that can be detected by partial proof tests.
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Figure 4.1: (a)Reliability block diagram of failure rate that are revealed and non-revealed by
proof tests. (b) Illustration of the Test Coverage Factor
Z TCFmax: Fraction of hidden failures that can be detected by imperfect proof tests.
The method that we present for estimating TCF and TCFmax is based on the FMEA approach.
The FMEA approach is discussed in the next section.
If the coverage factor is equal to 100%, the proof test is obviously perfect and full; whereas
if the test is imperfect because not all hidden failures can be revealed by a full proof test, the
coverage factor has a maximum value (TCFmax) and there are therefore hidden failures that are
never tested. If partial proof test is implemented, we should have an estimate of the TCF of
hidden failures that may be revealed by the test.
From the previous definition, the failure rate can be split into hidden failures detected only
by full proof test(e.g., (TCFmax−TCF) ·λ); hidden failures that are detected by partial and also
by full proof tests(e.g., TCF ·λ ); and hidden failures that are never detected by a proof test (e.g.,
(1-TCFmax) ·λ). Figure (4.1a) shows the reliability block diagram of failure rate that are revealed
and not revealed by proof tests. The split of failure rate is similar to the approach presented by
(Jin and Rausand, 2014; Brissaud et al., 2010; Rausand, 2014), but they do not consider failures
rates that are never tested. Figure (4.1b) illustrates the concept of the TCF and its relationship
with proof tests.
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4.3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
IEC60812 (2006) defines FMEA as a systematic procedure for the analysis of a system to iden-
tify the failure modes, their causes and effects on system performance. A simple example of a
FMEA worksheet is presented in appendix B. There are two variations of the FMEA approach:
the FMECA and the FMEDA.
FMECA (Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis) is an extension to the FMEA to in-
clude a means of ranking the severity of the failure modes to allow prioritization of countermea-
sures (IEC60812, 2006).
FMEDA(Failure Modes Effects and Diagnostic Analysis) has additional columns to cover fail-
ure classification, diagnostic related for each failure mode, detectability of failure modes, sys-
tems specific failure rates and diagnostic coverage (Rausand, 2014).
An FMEA is a simple and powerful tool for qualitative reliability analysis. It helps us to under-
stand how and why a system can fail. A thorough understanding of the functionality of a system
may be obtained by the correct application of this technique. As mentioned, here, we use an
FMEA as the basis for determining the TCF both for partial and full proof test. Some examples
of FMEDA, with suggested coverage factors for specific products are available on the web from
some projects developed by Exida1. The procedure for determining the coverage factor is not
described in the reports developed by Exida.
4.4 Method for Estimating the Test Coverage Factors
The procedure for determining the TCF is based on the method described by (Lundteigen and
Rausand, 2008). We recall that TCF corresponds to the coverage factor of partial proof tests and
TCFmax to coverage factor for modelling imperfect (full) proof tests. Lundteigen and Rausand
(2008) propose that the coverage factor can be expressed as
TC F =
n∑
i=1
TC FF Mi ·wi (4.1)
1Exida is an international consulting company that provides product certification with IEC61508
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Failure
modes
Failure
rate
Weight
Partial
proof tests
Full
proof tests
F Mi λDUi wi TC F
P
F Mi
T C F FF Mi
Table 4.1: Summary of the required information for estimating the TCFFMi
where FMi denotes the ith failure mode that may be found by an FMEA amongst n failures
modes; wi is the weight(importance) of the FMi amongst all failures modes of the component,
and it can be found from
wi =
λDUi∑n
i=1λDUi
(4.2)
and TCFFMi denotes the percentage that a FMi is covered by a proof test. FMi is basically esti-
mated by expert judgment.
The information required to estimate the TCF for both partial and full proof tests can be
gathered for each failure mode as shown in table (4.1)
As mentioned, the estimation of TCFFMi is based on expert judgment; but also it can be
estimated based on analysis of the component under study. The analysis should consider for
example, functionality, interfacing, dynamics, ageing, deterioration of the internal parts of the
item. By doing this analysis, we can find the relationship between the different failures modes
FMi and their effects on each single part j of the item. For example, consider a hydraulically
operated fail-safe valve (a shutdown valve) during partial stroke testing: (i) the spring of the
actuator is decompressed a few centimetres, (ii)the seat and the seals of valve are not tested, (iii)
the hydraulic oil contained in the actuator is not fully bled off, and so on.
The failure modes identified through the FMEA are examined against each part of the com-
ponent (e.g., the spring, the seat, the seal, the gate, etc. of a shutdown valve). From this exam-
ination we can quantify how much each part is tested while revealing a FMi . This is quantified
as the percentage δ. Table (4.2) shows a template for documenting the information required for
the quantification of δ. For example, for the failure mode fail to open of a valve, the seat of the
valve is not tested while revealing this failure mode, therefore, δ is equal to zero. On the other
hand, for example, the spring is decompressed a few centimetres. This fraction of decompres-
sion of the spring is a measure of δ for the spring while considering the failure mode fail to open.
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F. Modes
Parts Part 1 Part 2 ... Part j ... Part n
F Mi δ1 δ2 ... δ j ... δn
Table 4.2: Matrix for determining the TCFFMi per failure mode
When δ is equal to zero, this value should not be taken into account in computation of TCF or
TCFmax(see 4.3).
The TCFi for both full and partial proof test can be found as the geometric mean amongst
all δ j as follow
TC FF Mi = n
√
n∏
i=1
δ j (4.3)
Notice that for a full perfect proof test, δ is always equal to 1, therefore, TCF (e.g., in 4.1) is equal
to 1.
4.4.1 Procedure(Summary)
In this part, we exemplify the procedure for estimating the TCF and the TCFmax. These parame-
ters are computed for the SS-RAM used in the WOCS safety functions ESD and EQD.
Step 1. Perform an FMEA. The first step consist in performing an exhaustive FMEA. The
main objective is to find all the failure modes and the corresponding failure rate λ. The main
failure modes of the SS-RAM are listed in table (4.3).
Step 2. Computation of importance of each failure mode. The weight wi is an indicator of
the importance of the failures modes identified through the FMEA.
The weight of each failure mode is presented in the last column of the table (4.3). The values
were calculated by using (4.2) and the values of λ from table (4.3).
Table (4.3) summarizes the failure modes, their corresponding failure rates and weight, for
the SS-RAM. The information of the failure rates was extracted from OREDA (2009a).
Step 3. Computation of the TCFper failuremode. TCFFMi may be found by expert judgment
or by using (4.3).
The objective is to quantify how much each part is tested while revealing a FMi during a
proof test. Since the computation of TCFFMi by using (4.3) requires a deep understanding and
CHAPTER 4. TEST COVERAGE FACTOR 31
Failure
modes
Failure
rate (·10−6) Weight wi
Fail to Close 38 0.357
Fail to Shear 6.2 0.058
Fail to Open 38 0.357
Internal Leakage 18 0.169
External Leakage 6.2 0.058
Table 4.3: Failure modes and failure rates for the SS-RAM
knowledge of the SS-RAM, we omit to use that approach. As a result, the following assumptions
are made:
• The failure mode fail to close is fully tested by both partial and full proof tests. During this
proof tests the SS-RAM travels from the opened position to the closed position, therefore,
for this failure mode, TCFPFM and TCF
F
FM are equal to one for both proof tests.
• The failure mode fail to shear is only revealed during a real demand, hence, TCFPFM and
TCFFFM are equal to zero for both proof tests.
• The failure mode fail to open is fully tested by both partial and full proof tests. The SS-
RAM should be returned to the opened position, therefore, for this failure mode, TCFPFM
and TCFFFM are equal to one for both proof tests.
• The failure mode internal leakage is partially tested in a partial proof test. We assume that
60% of the seals are tested during this test. During a full proof test, this failure mode is
fully tested.
• The failure mode external leakage is partially tested during a partial proof test. We assume
that this failure mode is detected when the SS-RAM remains in closed position. Given that
the SS-RAM remains closed a short fraction of time during a partial proof test, 20% may
be reasonable value for TCFPFM. This failure mode is fully tested by full proof tests.
Table (4.4) summarizes the values estimated for TCFPFM and TCF
F
FM for each failure mode.
Step 4. Computation of the TCFs. The estimated TCF and TCFmax can be found by using
(4.1).
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Failure
modes
TCFFMi Partial
Proof Tests
TCFFMi Full
Proof Tests
Fail to Close 1 1
Fail to Shear 0 0
Fail to Open 1 1
Internal Leakage 0.7 1
External Leakage 0.2 1
Table 4.4: Failure modes and failure rates of the Shear Seal RAM
The TCF and TCFmax for the SS-RAM become
TCF= 1∗0.357+0∗0.058+1∗0.357+0.7∗0.169+0.2∗0.058= 84.39% (4.4)
TCFmax = 1∗0.357+0∗0.058+1∗0.357+1∗0.169+1∗0.058= 94.1% (4.5)
4.4.2 Impact of the Test Coverage Factor to System’s Reliability
It can be noticed that the test coverage factors are estimated for components, and the main as-
sumption is that the failure rateλ of each failure mode is independent from other failure modes.
It allows to split the failure rate into the three components as explained in section 4.2. The main
effect of a test coverage factor is that, it illustrates how much the time dependent probability
failure on demand, PFD(t), is reduced when a proof test is carried out. High coverage factors
lead to low PFDavg.
Let us consider a coverage factor for a safety function. This new coverage factor obviously
depends on the TCF and the TCFmax and it is reasonable to state that there is a direct correla-
tion between the new coverage factor and TCF, or TCFmax. For example, an increase of TCF or
TCFmax leads to an increase of the coverage factor of the safety function. This issue is no longer
discussed in this master’s thesis.
The use of the TCF and TCFmax is exemplified in the next chapter and these parameters are
the cornerstone for the model of the time dependent availability that we propose in this master’s
thesis.
Chapter 5
Methods for the Reliability Assessment
5.1 Introduction
In previous chapters we presented some of the factors influencing reliability assessment of
WOCS. Amongst them, we discussed the effect of partial and imperfect proof testing, short test
intervals and test coverage factors. In addition, the description, operational and testing philos-
ophy of the WOCS system were provided.
The reliability of safety systems is often assessed by calculating the average unavailability. In
this chapter we discuss some methods for reliability assessment of safety systems (e.g., a WOCS).
The main advantages and disadvantages of each method are discussed.
In chapter 8 we focus on the total unavailability of a simple component considering the
major contributors to this reliability measure(e.g., PDFavg, unavailability due duration of the
test, repair times, etc). In this chapter we focus on some methods for determining the PDFavg
of complex systems. We recall that the PFDavg is often used as the reliability measure for safety
systems.
5.2 Reliability Block Diagrams
A Reliability block diagrams(RBD) is a successful-oriented network1 describing a function of a
system (e.g., a safety system). It represents the logical connections of components of the system
1The networks are built by thinking in terms of functions
33
CHAPTER 5. METHODS FOR THE RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 34
under study. The resulting logical diagram of the components connected in parallel or in series,
or a combination of both, indicates how the specified system function is fulfilled.
By using the formulas for the structure function of single logical diagrams in series or paral-
lel, we can find the reliability function of the system under study. These formulas are presented
in (5.1) and (5.2) 2
RS(t )=
n∏
k=1
Rk (t ) For series systems (5.1)
RP (t )= 1−
n∏
k=1
(1−Rk (t )) For parallel systems (5.2)
Where Rk (t ) is the reliability function of one single component.
If the system is subject to proof testing and consequent repair actions, the reliability function
is referred as the availability function (e.g., A(t )).
Consider a component that is subject to partial and full proof tests at τp and τ respectively;
and also consider that the component has hidden failures that are revealed and never revealed
by proof tests as discussed chapter 4. If we assume that the failure rates of the component are
exponentially distributed, the availability function Ak (t ) of this component may be found from
(5.3).
Ak (t )= e−T C F ·λ·(t−τp j ,i )e−(T C Fm−TC F )·λ·(t−τi )e−(1−TC Fm )·λ·t (5.3)
Ak (t ) in (5.3) is valid for t ≥ 0, i > 1, 16 j 6 n, and τp j ,i denotes the jth of n partial proof tests
in test interval (τi ,τi+1] of full proof tests. In (5.3), τ is not a fixed value and it increases over the
time. The length of the interval (τi ,τi+1) may be (but not necessarily) constant (e.g., periodic
proof testing). The same concept applies for τp j . We clarify that at the time instant of a full
proof test, τp = τ.
As mentioned, we are interested in the unavailability function for the reliability assessment
of safety systems. Figure (5.1) shows the curve of the unavailability function Uk (t ) = 1− Ak (t ).
The figure (5.1) presents the two cases when TCFmax = 1 and when the TCFmax < 1.
If the full proof tests are periodic and perfect, TCFmax is equal to one, leading the average
unavailability U¯k to be equal in each full proof test interval (see figure (5.1a). In contrast, if the
2The formulas presented is the result of the use of probability theory by assuming independent components
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Figure 5.1: Unavailability function Uk (t ) a single component that is subject to partial and full
proof tests. (a) Uk (t ) when TCFmax = 1 (b)Uk (t ) when TCFmax < 1
full proof tests are imperfect, the likelihood of failure on demand increases over time (see figure
(5.1b)).
5.3 Average Unavailability of the WOCS
5.3.1 Background
The operational philosophy of the WOCS described in chapter 2 may be summarized and illus-
trated as in figure (5.2a). The WOCS is in-service or is not, with an unknown duration period. The
testing requirement of carrying out a full proof test, just before the WOCS is put into a workover
operation, is shown in figures (5.2a) and (5.2b)(e.g., τ0, τ1,τ2). The figure (5.2b) shows the effect
of imperfect full proof test to the unavailability function at the time instant τ. It also can be seen
that the WOCS is subject to partial proof test every 7 days (e.g., τpi ). The red dashed line in fig-
ure (5.2), indicates the assumption that after a WO operation, there are hidden failures that keep
dormant until the maintenance that is carried out between WO operations. (e.g., between in-
tervals (t1,t2),(t3,t4)). The instantaneous unavailability between these periods is of importance,
because the WOCS is subject to imperfect proof tests. We assume that the maintenance carried
out after a WO operation eliminates all hidden failures, except the failure "fail to shear" of the
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Figure 5.2: Operational and Testing Philosophy. (a) Operational scheme for the WOCS. (b)
WOCS unavailability function including partial proof tests and imperfect full proof tests.
SS-RAM. We assume that the proof test every 14 days reveals all hidden failures, excepting the
failure "fail to shear" of the SS-RAM.
The average unavailability of the WOCS, U¯ , better known as the PFDavg, is found for each
safety function by using (5.4).
PFDavg = 1− 1
t2− t1
∫ t2
t1
A(t )SY Sd t (5.4)
A(t )SY S may be found from the RBD of the safety functions described chapter 2 by using (5.1),
(5.2) and (5.3). If the full proof test are perfect and periodic, (5.4) can be calculated in the interval
(0,τ); by determining the proper test interval, the safety integrity level(SIL) is kept equal during
the life cycle of the system. This is valid only under the assumption that after a full proof test,
the system is brought to a state "as-good-as-new". On the other hand, if the full proof test is
imperfect, the average unavailability in the interval (τi ,τi+1] is not a proper indicator of the
reliability of the system. In such case, it is better to consider the average unavailability in each
interval, or use other reliability measure, like the frequency of failure. Nonetheless, any chosen
reliability measure increases overtime. Figure (5.2b) shows that the safety integrity level reduces
over the time because of imperfect proof tests.
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Figure 5.3: Flow diagram for computing the average unavailability of a single component subject
to partial and full proof test
5.3.2 Solution
The analytically solution of (5.4) can be rather complex and it requires the use of a software
algorithm. We implemented an algorithm in MATLAB that computes the average unavailability
of a system taking into account the issues illustrated in figure (5.2). The algorithm implemented
in MATLAB for computation of the average unavailability of a single component is summarized
in the flow diagram shown in figure (5.3). Setting of the initial parameters includes the definition
of (for example) the failure rates, test coverage factors, instant times for partial and full proof
tests and period of interest, (e.g., life time , [0,LT ]).
In order to compute the PDFavg, the process into the red dashed box in figure (5.3) must be
run for each component for obtaining the time dependent availability as in (5.3). Afterwards,
the time dependent availability of the system is computed by using (5.1) and (5.2) depending on
the RBD that represents the system’s function of interest.
Finally, the PDFavg is computed by using (5.4). The average unavailability U¯ depends on the
value of TCFmax. For TCFmax = 1, the PDFavg is computed in the interval (0,τ). For TCFmax < 1,
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Figure 5.4: Example of a Fault Tree
the average is computed for the interval of interest. (e.g., Lifetime, [0,LT ]).
The script of the algorithm implemented in MATLAB can be found in appendix C.
5.4 Fault Tree Analysis
A Fault Tree Analysis(FTA) is a top-down analysis performed from the top event (e.g., unwanted
event) by building step by step, logical links between individual failures (e.g., basic events). Logic
gates (e.g., AND-gates, OR-Gates) are used for the construction of the Fault Tree as shown in
figure (5.4). Figure (5.4) is the Fault Tree that represents the component failure of a component
modelled by the reliability block diagram in figure (4.1a). The three basic events corresponds
to a hidden failures revealed by partial and full proof tests, hidden failure revealed only by full
proof tests and hidden failures that are never tested, as discussed in chapter 4.
5.4.1 PDFavg Calculations
The quantification of the PDFavg of a system represented in a Fault Tree may be performed using
the following approaches:
1 Conversion of the Fault Tree into a RBD and then computation the PDFavg as explained in
the previous section.
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2 Computation of the PDFavg by the use of analytical formulae approach.
3 Computation of the PDFavg from the instantaneous unavailability curve of the TOP EVENT
by using Boolean algebra.
5.4.2 Analytical Formulae Approach
The minimal cut set theory is the foundation for the analytical models. From a RBD or a FTA,
we can determine the minimal cut sets (e.g., r). From the series structure3 of these r minimal
cut sets, we compute the average unavailability of the system. By assuming that, (i) the mini-
mal cuts set are independent, and (ii) the product of the average unavailability (e.g., Qˇi ) of the
minimal cut sets are negligible compared with its sum, the average unavailability of the system
(e.g., Qo in (5.5)) can be found from the summation of the of these quantities. The result from
(5.5) gives a conservative value, because (i) the products from the formula used in order to find
the probability Pr(E1 ∪E2 ∪ ...∪En) are disregarded and (ii)the minimal cut sets are positively
dependent since some components may be is several minimal cut parallel structures (Rausand
and Høyland, 2004).
Qo ≈
r∑
i=1
Qˇi (5.5)
A minimal cut parallel structure fails if all components in the structure fail. However, since the
average probability of periodically tested components cannot be used directly to calculate the
average probability of a minimal cut set, because the average probability of a product is not
the product of the average of these quantities((ISO/TR-12489, 2013), the product of the failure
probabilities may be corrected by a factor depending on the number of channels (e.g., n) in
the minimal parallel structure ((Lundteigen and Rausand, 2008)). Therefore, Qˇi in (5.5) can be
found from
Qˇi ≈ 2
n
n+1 ·
n∏
j=1
q¯ j (5.6)
3A system with r minimal cut sets may be represented by a series structure of the r minimal cut parallel struc-
tures
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Figure 5.5: RBD of a structure of two components connected in parallel where each component
is modelled by a series of two "subcomponents" with failure rate revealed at τp and τ respec-
tively
where q¯ j in (5.6) is the average probability of failure of a single component and it can found
from4
q¯ j ≈
λ j ·TC F j ·τp
2
+ λ j · (1−TC F j ) ·τ
2
(5.7)
where λ j is the failure rate of the jth component in the minimal cut set and TCF j is its proof
test coverage factor. We reader should notice that q¯ j does not include the basic event 3 from
figure (5.4). This is because of the underlying assumption for the analytical formulae, that the
components are periodically tested and the full proof test are perfect.
Consider a system of two independent components connected in parallel. Also consider that
the system is subject to partial proof tests and the average unavailability of each component
can be found by using (5.7), therefore, the system can be modelled by the RBD in figure (5.5).
The simple system in figure (5.5) has four minimal cut sets; if the failure rate of the 2 main
components are in the same order of magnitude, the products of the four terms from (5.6) are
also in the same magnitude (none term can be neglected).
An important characteristic of this approach is that it gives proper results when the compo-
nents have the same instant time for the full proof tests. Otherwise, the quantity in (5.6) gives
non-conservative values. This is because of the static feature of the fault trees. The components,
however, may be subject to different number partial proof tests.
5.4.3 Boolean Models
Probabilistic calculations based on Boolean equations are basically time independent. Never-
theless, if the components in a system are independent, time-dependent formulas can be still
4Once again, we assume that the product of the average probabilities is negligible compared with its sum.
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Figure 5.6: Average unavailability calculation (Example)
used(ISO/TR-12489, 2013).
The formulas in (5.8) and (5.9) can be used for the computation of the time dependent un-
availability of events in a Fault Tree. Notice that formulas are similar to (5.1) and (5.2), but in
this case the formulas are derived thinking in terms of failures. Figure (5.6) exemplifies the use
of (5.8) and (5.9). The output of the gate G2 is found by using (5.9), and the output of the gate G1
is found by using (5.8).
The algorithm implemented in MATLAB can be used for computation of the instantaneous
unavailability Uk (t ) (e.g., Uk (t )= 1− Ak (t )).
U∩(t )=
n∏
j=1
Uk (t ) For AND-gates (5.8)
U∪(t )= 1−
n∏
j=1
(1−Uk (t )) For OR-gates (5.9)
As it has been shown, the time dependent unavailability Uk (t ) is input to the logic gates (e.g.,
see figure (5.3). This unavailability function may correspond to events at upper levels or basic
events in a Fault Tree (e.g., a single component as represented in the RBD in figure(5.4)).
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Figure 5.7: Example of a simple Petri Net showing the main graphical elements
The instantaneous unavailability US(t ) is found by using (5.8) and (5.9) and the average un-
availability U¯ (e.g., PDFavg) can be found by using
U¯ = 1
t2− t1
∫ t2
t1
US(t ) (5.10)
5.5 Petri Nets
A Petri Net is a technique for describing the behaviour of a system by modelling the relationship
between states and events. The states are represented by places and the events are represented
by transitions; places and transitions can be connected by arcs. A place may contain tokens for
simulating, for example, a working state, a failed state, etc. A place represents an active state if it
contains a token. Sometimes, the place may require more than one token to represent an active
state. Transitions may be constrained by (i)deterministic values (e.g., a delay) (ii) stochastic
variables (e.g., a random value that follows a specified probability distribution), (iii) conditional
statements (predicates), and (iv) arc constrains (e.g., weights or inhibitors).
Calculations from Petri Nets are based on Monte Carlo Simulation. Figure (5.7) summarizes
the graphical elements used in a Petri Net.
In this chapter we present the use of Petri Nets for modelling the unavailability of a system
with failure rate revealed and non-revealed by proof tests. Virtual RBDs are used to drive the
building of the Petri Nets. It basically helps to build the Petri Net and understand the behaviour
of the system.
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Figure 5.8: Example of a simple Petri Net Driven by a Virtual RBD
5.5.1 Petri Nets driven by Virtual RBDs
Given a system’s RBD, we can draw a Petri Net for each block (of the RBD) for representing a
single component. The Petri Net for modelling the behaviour of the whole system, is therefore
the group of all single Petri Nets. This concept is exemplified for a system composed by three
components as shown in figure (5.8).
Consider the simple system as shown in figure (5.8). A component A in series with two com-
ponents in parallel (B,C). The Boolean equation that indicates if the system is functioning is
given by (5.11)(e.g. Out = 1).
Out = A∩ (B ∪C )= A · (B +C ) (5.11)
A,B,C represents the binary states of functioning or failed state of the components. Notice that
a variable (A,B,C) is created for each component in order to indicate if it is functioning or failed.
For example, the variable is set to false during the transition from working state to failed state,
and it is set to true during the transition from failed state to working state. These assertions are
represented in a Petri Net by the character !. (e.g. !A=true as shown in figure (5.8)).
In order to know the average unavailability of the system, an auxiliary Petri Net as shown
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Figure 5.9: Petri Net for modelling Periodic perfect full proof test
in figure (5.7) is required. The transitions t1 and t2 in figure (5.7) are constrained by the predi-
cates ?Out=false and ?Out=true respectively. Therefore, the average unavailability of the system
is given by the mean marking of the place p2. (average proportion of time that the place p2
contains a token). In this case, the average unavailability can also be found by adding the mean
markings of the places that are used to represent failed states.
5.5.2 Proof Testing Policies with Petri Nets
The behaviour of safety system comprises two main aspects: (i) the way the system fails, which
it can be modelled by the use of random events following a specified probability distribution,
and (ii) the way that the system is maintained, which for safety systems it follows a predefined
maintenance policy (e.g., periodic proof test). By considering the model presented to the failure
rate revealed by partial and full proof tests and failure never revealed, as presented in chapter
4, we have Petri Nets to represent the combinations of proof tests when considering the effect
of imperfect full proof tests and partial proof tests. In the following sections we present and
propose some Petri Nets for modelling the behaviour of a safety system.
5.5.3 Perfect Full Proof Test without Partial Proof Tests
The Petri Net that may be used to model the test regime of periodic perfect proof test (without
partial proof tests) is presented in figure (5.9).
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A token in place p1 indicates that the component is functioning. When the component has
a hidden failure (failure event due to λFDU ), the transition t1 is fired and the token in place p1 is
removed and transferred to the place p3. The token in place p3 is removed when there is token
in place p5(meaning that a proof test is ongoing). If the transition t3 is fired, it means that the
hidden failure is revealed and repair actions take place (a token is released to place p4). The
token in place p4 is removed after the mean down time due to repair actions (e.g., 1/µ). When
the transition t5 is fired, a token is released to place p1 (the component is restore to a working
state), and a token is released also to place p2 (a new test period is started).
The transition t2 is fired every τ (delay of t2). the transition t4 is fired when the proof test is
ongoing and the component does not have hidden failures. The duration of the proof test may
be simulated by specifying a delay in transitions t3 and t4 respectively5. Notice that the variable
A is set to false when there is failure and it is set to true when the component is restore to a
working state. This variable can be used in the Boolean equation of the RBD of the system, as
explained at the beginning of this section. In this simple Petri Net, the average unavailability of
the component is equal to the sum of the mean marking of the places p3 and p4 . As mentioned,
the Petri Net from figure (5.7) can also be used to find the average unavailability. Therefore, the
sum of the mean markings of the places p3 and p4 is the same as the mean marking of the place
p2 in figure (5.7). In this case Out = A. This Net is also described by (Rausand, 2014).
Perfect Full Proof Test and Partial Proof Tests
a Petri Net for modelling the test policy that a component is partially tested m−1 times in a test
interval of perfect full proof tests is presented in figure (5.10). This Petri Net is consistent with
the idea that a component has (i)hidden failures revealed by partial proof tests and also by full
proof tests, and (ii)hidden failures revealed only by full proof tests.
The Petri net in figure (5.10) has two places (p4 and p10) to denote that a failure event with
failure rate equal to λPDU = TC F ·λDU or λFDU = (1−TC F ) ·λDU may occur. The total failure rate
of the component is equal to λDU = λPDU +λFDU . Notice that we assume that the failure events
are independent.
After a failure event due to λPDU , the transition t1 is fired and a token is released to place p4.
5In general, the transitions with the shape as t3 are instant transitions
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Figure 5.10: Petri Net for modelling Periodic perfect full proof test and m−1 partial proof tests
in the test interval of full proof tests
Similarly, after a failure event due to λFDU (hidden failures only revealed by full proof tests), the
transition t6 is fired and a token is released to place p10.
When a partial proof test takes place (the transition t2 has been fired) a token is present in
place p5, therefore, if there is a hidden failure due to λPDU , transition t4 is fired; or, if there is no
hidden failures due to λPDU , the transition t5 is fired. Nonetheless, a token is released to place
p8. Transitions t8a and t8b are constrained by the predicates F1∪F2 = tr ue and F1∩F2 = f al se,
respectively. At this point, a decision is made whereas repair actions take place or a new testing
interval starts. The variables F1 and F2 are used to indicate if a failure has occurred and repair
actions should take place. For example, F1 and F2 are set to true when hidden failures has been
revealed. See transitions t4 and t10 in figure (5.10).
When the transition t2 is fired a token is also released to place p9. However, transition t9 or
t10 is not fired until the number of tokens in place p9 are equal to m, meaning that a full proof
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test is taking place; If hidden failure occurs due to λFDU (represented by a token in place p10), the
variable F2 is set to true and repair actions take place, because the predicate in transition t8a is
met.
After repair actions, transitions t11a and/or t3a are fired if and only if failures due to λPDU and
λFDU had occurred, respectively; otherwise, the tokens in places p4 and p3 are removed through
transitions t11b or t3b avoiding the increase of the number of tokens in places p1 or p6. The
decision taken in transitions t11b and t3b are constrained if failures have occurred. For example,
the variable F1 is set to true when a hidden failure due to λPDU is revealed and set to false after a
repair.
We have used several assertions (e.g., !F2 = f al se) and predicates (e.g., ?F1 = tr ue). They
help to reduce the number of places and the complexity the Petri Net.
It is straightforward to show that the places p1 and p6 can be reduced to one place by estab-
lishing additional constrains (predicates) to the transitions t1 and t6. The resulting Petri Net is
described in appendix D.
The average unavailability of a component modelled by the Petri Net in figure (5.10) can be
found by using the Petri Net in figure (5.7). Figure (5.7) requires the two variables (e.g., U1 and
U2) to enable the transitions t1 or t2. For example, the variable U1 is toggled to true when failure
due to λPDU occurs, and it is toggled to false when this type of failure is repaired. Now we can
use Out = (U1∪U2) in the Petri Net in figure (5.7). If the component is unavailable, Out = 1. We
recall that the average unavailability is given by the mean marking of the place p2 in figure (5.7).
Modelling hidden failures that are never revealed
For modelling hidden failures that are never revealed by using Petri Nets, we only requires two
places and one transition. Figure (5.11) shows the simple Petri Net that can be used for this
purpose. The transition t1 is fired only once, meaning that a failure event with failure rate λNDU =
(1−TCFmax) ·λDU has occurred.
In summary, for modelling a component that is subject to imperfect full proof test, the Petri
Nets in figures (5.9) and (5.11) are used together. In this case the failure rate of hidden failures
revealed during a full proof test becomes equal to λFDU =TCFmax ·λDU .
For modelling a component that is subject to imperfect full proof test and partial proof test,
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Figure 5.11: Petri Net for modelling hidden failures that are never revealed
the Petri Nets in figure (5.10) and (5.11) are used together. In this case the failure rate of hidden
failures revealed only during a full proof test becomes equal to λFDU = (TCFmax−TCF) ·λDU .
By using the combination of these Petri Nets (e.g., Figures (5.9),(5.10),(5.11)), we can build a
Petri Net driven by virtual RBD as in figure (5.8). The resulting Petri Net considers independent
repair teams, which it is usually not the real case. In order to find a realistic average unavail-
ability of the safety system that models a single repair team, we need to modify the Petri Net in
figure (5.10). The new Petri Net is shown in figure (5.12). The Petri Net in figure (5.12) was built
by considering the following:
• Only one transition like t2 with a delay equal to τ/m that models the periodic proof test
is required. Therefore, arcs should connect transition t2 to each place that is used to indi-
cates that a test is ongoing (e.g., p5 and p9)
• Only one place like p8 is required (For example in the first component).
• Only one transition like t8a is required, and its predicate must contain all variables that
indicates that a hidden failure has occurred. (e.g., ?F1∪F2∪F3∪ ...∪Fn = tr ue). If only
one of n failures occur, repair action takes place.
• Only one transition like t8b is required, and its predicate must contain all variables that
indicates that a hidden failure has occurred. (e.g., ?F1∩F2∩F3∩ ...∩Fn = f al se). If none
of n failures has occurred, a new test interval starts.
• Only one transition like t7 is required. Therefore, arcs should connect transition t7 to
places like p11 and p3.
As we can notice, the place p8 is not required in n-1 components of the system to be mod-
elled. Figure (5.12) shows the resulting Petri Nets. The Petri Net in figure (5.12a) is repeated for
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Figure 5.12: Petri Nets to be used in Petri Nets driven by RBD
each component of the system that is subject for partial proof test (without p8; check the second
item in previous paragraphs). The Petri Nets in figure (5.12b) models the delay of partial tests
and the repair. Notice the circles in blue colour, these are shortcuts used to connect to places
with the same label (e.g., p12). For each component added in the Petri driven by RBD, a shortcut
should be added for the repair and the test actions. In appendix D we present a simple example
Petri Net driven by RBD.
5.6 Method Comparison
We have presented four approaches for assessing the unavailability due to time related failures.
These approaches are the use of (i)the structure functions of RBD, (ii) Analytical Formulae de-
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rived from Fault Tree analysis, (iii) time dependent unavailability based on Fault Tree analysis
(which it is another way of presenting RBD), and (iv)Petri Nets which uses Montecarlo Simula-
tion to perform the analysis.
Amongst the known techniques available for reliability analysis (see e.g., ISO/TR-12489,
2013) we have not discussed Markov analysis. This is because we are interested in modelling
the effect to proof testing (e.g., of safety systems), and because proof tests are carried out a de-
terministic time instants(Brissaud and Oliveira, 2012), transition from failed states (under the
assumption that the failure is repaired) are not exponentially distributed, which is the founda-
tion for Markov chains(Rausand and Høyland, 2004). In this case, multi-phase Markov models
are more proper to include the effect of periodic proof testing(ISO/TR-12489, 2013).
The methods discussed in this chapter may be compared taking into account two main fac-
tors (see e.g., Brissaud and Oliveira, 2012). Features of the model and of the analysis.
5.6.1 Models Relationship
RBD are built in term of functions and it may lead to unknown effects of failure of components in
the system. This disadvantage can be overcome by the use of Fault Tree Analysis. However, both
RBD and FTA are static models and therefore the dynamics of the system cannot be described.
On the other hand, Petri Nets are suitable for modelling the dynamics of the system and they
can be easily built by using virtual RBD, Virtual RBD that can be drawn from FTA. The size of the
virtual RBDs is almost equal to number of components of the system. This make the graphical
representation of the model easy to read and understand it, even whit the inclusion of Petri
Nets. The use of Petri Nets driven by virtual RBD makes the model less prone to modelling
errors because the component’s Petri Net have the same structure.
5.6.2 Analysis
In the previous paragraph we discussed the main relationship amongst the techniques used in
this report and how we can end using Petri Nets. However, each technique (the technique itself)
has its own way for doing the analysis. As we are interested on the average unavailability of safety
systems subject to periodic full proof test, partial proof test, imperfect proof test, we proposed a
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model (e.g., see Eq (5.3)) and we incorporated the proposed model in the use of each technique.
As mentioned, the analytical solution for finding the total availability of the system from the
RBD6 and using the proposed model requires the use of software. It can be a limitation since
foundation in programming is essential for understanding the model and avoid the use of the
algorithm that we presented as a "black box". However, the correct use of the proposed algo-
rithm provides an exact solution and a very good illustration of the instant unavailability by
including the effect of proof tests (perfect, partial or imperfect). Other advantage of the pro-
posed approach is the flexibility to include other probability distributions. For example, we can
use the availability function by assuming the Weibull distribution in the same way that we used
the exponential distribution.
We also discussed the use of analytical formulae derived from the minimal cut set theory.
As mentioned, with this approach we cannot model the effect of imperfect proof testing and
several approximations are needed to compute the average unavailability. The "difficult" part is
to find the minimal cut sets; but software tools are available for this matter (e.g., CARA). From
the package CARA we can also compute the average unavailability based on the upper bound
approximation(Rausand and Høyland, 2004) which is less conservative than the result that can
be obtained from Eq. (5.5). The main disadvantage of this approach is that it is limited to failure
rates exponentially distributed.
Petri Nets driven by virtual RBD are easy to build and the technique is very flexible. Different
factors like demands and test duration may be included. The limitation of this technique lies
on the package capabilities and the ability of the analyst, mainly due to systematic errors. Bris-
saud and Oliveira (2012) claim that the only drawback of this technique is the time required to
perform the analysis.
6RBD that can be derived from a FTA
Chapter 6
Failure Modes and Reliability Data Analysis
6.1 Introduction
The identification of the modes in which a system may fail is as important as the technique used
in the reliability analysis. In this chapter we discuss the main failure modes that may affect the
major components of a WOCS. For each failure mode we present a short description and the
effects due to proof testing.
6.2 Failure Modes
6.2.1 Fail to Operate - Valves
Fail to operate (open or close) is one the most common failure modes for process valves. Shut-
down valves are the main type of valves used in safety systems, and in principle a shutdown valve
should close in order to prevent hazardous events, making fail to close one of the most critical
failure modes. Valves used in subsea production systems are usually fail safe and hydraulically
operated valves. A subsea shutdown valve may not close because (i)it gets jammed, (ii)the sup-
ply of pressurized hydraulic oil1 is not high enough to overcome the column of hydraulic oil from
the (e.g.,) LRP to the sea level and (iii) or the return line that allows to bleed off the hydraulic oil
is obstructed. The valve may get jammed because mechanical failure of the stem, the spring or
1Even though the valves are designed to fail safely, the movement of the gate to the closed position may require
extra force
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the piston. (e.g., a broken part). A return line may be obstructed because pilot valves (usually
pulse operated solenoid valves) does not switch or because other valves(e.g., manual valves) in
the return flow line are closed. When the depth of installation of the LRP is deep enough that
it avoids the spring to overcome the column of hydraulic oil, supply of pressurized hydraulic
oil is required to help the spring for the displacement of the valve’s gate to the closed position.
If the pressure in the hydro-pneumatic accumulators2 is not high enough, or the supply line is
obstructed, the valve may fail to close on demand, or at least it closes slowly, which it is other
failure mode that may have negative effects for the fulfilment of safety functions.
Fail to open for shutdown valves may not be critical regarding to safety issues. However,
fail to open for the surface tree wing valve used for the PSD function is a critical failure mode.
This type of failure for shutdown valves may have negative economic impacts due to delays, for
example during a proof testing. In this case, in order to open the valve, pressurized hydraulic oil
is supplied from the surface, therefore, fail to open may be strongly related to failure of the HPU.
6.2.2 Fail to Operate - Shear Seal RAM
The actuator of a SS-RAM, functions similarly as the actuator of gate valves(metal blocks are slid
due to release of high hydraulic pressure); In this case, the actuators of the SS-RAM are fitted
with RAMS that are designed to shear (cut) a coiled tubing, to stop the flow of hydrocarbons
and to provided seal. Fail to close and fail to cut are referred as the same type of failure for SS-
RAMs. However, fail to close is properly used to refer to the fact that a SS-RAM does not close
when there are not running tools into the wellbore, on the other hand, fail to cut, to refer the
fact that the SS-RAM is not able to close by shearing the coiled tubing or wireline running down
the wellbore. In both cases, the SS-RAM may fail to close because of mechanical failures in the
internal parts of one or both cylinder assembly that comprises the actuator of a SS-RAM. A SS-
RAM may also fail to close if the supply of hydraulic oil is insufficient, or mechanical failure of
the hydraulic assembly of the actuator. Fail to cut of the SS-RAM may occur due to collapse or
crush the ends of the blades while shearing. (Van Winkle, 2013)
2Hydro-Pneumatic accumulators are used to store hydraulic energy by pressurizing an inert gas
CHAPTER 6. FAILUREMODES AND RELIABILITY DATA ANALYSIS 54
6.2.3 Leakage
Leakage (internal or external) is a failure mode that may be present in all components that are
designed to isolate two fluid or to connect two (e.g., metal) bodies. Leakage is mainly a fail-
ure due to degradation of the sealing devices (e.g., an O-ring, a gasket) placed between the two
surfaces. The sealing devices are classified into dynamic and static. Degradation is affected
by pressure, temperature, surfaces to be joined, surface roughness, vibration, chemical attack,
compression set, plastic deformation, fluid properties(Piff, 2011). Degradation is also caused
by stress or fatigue, erosion or corrosion (Haarberg, 2011). Other factors that may lead to leak-
age are (i)improper maintenance(replacement) of this components, (ii) material defects of the
sealing devices, (iii) sand deposits, (iv) hydrates formation, and (v) formation of paraffin wax.
Leakage may be present in all major components of a WOCS (e.g., valves, pilot valves, umbil-
ical, SS-RAM, housings, housing connectors). Leakage may lead to hazardous events or higher
consumption of fluids(e.g., hydraulic oil).
A subsea production systems will experience leaking problem during its lifetime(NORSOK-
D010, 2013) , therefore, overcoming the leakage problems is one the challenges for designer and
operator of subsea production system .
6.2.4 Electronic and Electrical Failures
The failure mechanism of electronic and electrical (EE) failures of circuit boards for controlling
the solenoid valves in the WOCM and EE failures of the other electronic components (pressure
transmitters, flow transmitters) are related to excess of temperature, excess of current and/or
voltage, corrosion and stress. EE failures may lead to erratic reading of operating parameters, or
erratic outputs (commands) signals. Erratic signals may lead to unintended development of the
safety functions and loss of communication from the subsea equipment and the top side.
6.3 Effects of Proof Testing
The main objective of the proof testing is to reveal (and repair if it is necessary) failure modes as
described in the previous sections. A component usually has more than one failure mode and
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a proof test in carried out to reveal all of them or at least a fraction. On one hand, proof test-
ing has positive effects (revealing the failure mode is obviously the main one): movement and
lubrication of a mechanical part, stressing of electronic components between normal ranges of
operations, in general physical stimulation is necessary for good performance of the system. On
the other hand, physical stimulation has a significant correlation with wear, stress and fatigue.
Therefore, How much "stimulation" is needed?. The answer of this question depends on factors
like operating time, frequency of maintenance(inspections and replacement of wear items), op-
erating parameters, component’s material, safety requirements.
6.3.1 Reveal-Ability
Some failure modes are easily revealed and they do not require sophisticated means for the
revealing process. For example, fail to operate is found simply by sending commands to the
actuating component. On the hand, testing for leakage requires closed chambers and maybe a
different fluid. Other failure modes, like fail to sharing never is revealed because it is a destruc-
tive test. In order to measure how much a failure mode is revealed, a proof coverage factor is
used. (e.g., TCF) and it is equal to one if the failure mode is revealed. The coverage factor of fail
to operate depends on how much the valve or SS-RAM travels from one position to the other.
We recall that the coverage factor used in the reliability analysis concerns to proof tests of
specific components rather than component’s failure modes. However, the coverage factor of
failure modes is used to estimate the coverage factor of proof tests as explained in chapter 4.
6.4 Reliability Data Analysis
An FMEA is used to gather and summarize all information of failure modes of the different com-
ponents of a system. This information is of high quality if different types of data are analysed.
For example, we need maintenance data in the form of records; technical data in the form of
datasheets, drawings (e.g., electrical, hydraulic), functional block diagram for the understand-
ing of the functionality of the system; operational data with operational procedures, operational
parameters under control (e.g., pressure) for assuring high performance of the equipment.
In addition, and equally important, we need reliability data for correct estimation of ability
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of the system to function over the time (reliability prediction) without failures and consequent
avoidance of undesired events, especially for safety-critical systems.
Reliability data is mainly classified as generic, plant specific and based on expert judgment
(Rausand, 2014). Several databases are available for generic reliability data. See for example
Rausand (2014) for a list of the most used databases. Plant specific reliability data is the most
proper data, but often it is not available in usable form (e.g., without statistical analysis) or very
small that it does not allow us to estimate with enough level of confidence.
A common characteristic of most reliability sources is that the failure rate is assumed to
be constant (e.g., based on exponential distribution or Poisson process). This assumption is
valid for electronic components ((Fuqua, 1987)). For mechanical components, modelling an
increasing failure rate is more accurate. In addition, time independent factors that influence
the failure rate should also be included. Brissaud et al. (2011) proposes a model based on the
Weibull distribution and the Cox proportional hazard model for modelling the time-dependent
failure rate and influencing factors. Factor like design factors, factors related to manufacturing,
factors induced in the installation and maintenance. Factors or stressors like flow rate, sand
content are included in the Cox regression model. The introduction or exclusion of factor in the
Cox-model lead to different failure rates.
Chapter 7
Reliability Calculation of the WOCS
7.1 Introduction
In chapter 5 we described four approaches for estimating the PFDavg. The proposed model to
the time dependent availability (e.g., A(t)) takes into account that components may be subject
to partial proof tests and imperfect proof test (see e.g., Eq. 5.3 ). In chapter 4, we presented the
approach for estimating the test coverage factor to be used for modelling partial and imperfect
proof testing. In chapter 8 we discuss the major contributors to the unavailability of a safety
system and we presented the model for calculating the total average unavailability U¯ .
In this chapter we present the results to the PFDavg for the WOCS by using the approaches
discussed in chapter 5. A step-by-step method for computing the reliability measure of a WOCS
is included. Finally, some comments on the results are provided.
7.2 Method
7.2.1 Step 1. To Understand the System’s Functionality
The first step is to understand the functionality of the system. It is very important to know each
component of the system, inputs, outputs, operating parameters, operational ranges, bound-
aries, etc. It allows us to understand how the system functions, but most important how the
system may fail. We presented a description of the WOCS in chapter 2.
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7.2.2 Step 2. To Develop a FTA > Draw a RBD
Given that a Fault Tree is built thinking in terms of failures, the ultimate RBD(s) shall be drawn
based on the FTA(s). Notice that a system may be designed to develop more than one function.
It means that a RBD is required for each function. For example, for the WOCS we have three
RBDs, one for each safety function: PSD, ESD, EQD. These functions were described in chapter
2.
7.2.3 Step 3. To Develop a FMEA
The basic events identified on the FTA are usually components’ failures. Those components are
the critical components to be included in a FMEA study. An exhaustive analysis of the failure
modes for each component should be carried out; it will allow us to estimate a realistic test
coverage factor(s) to be used in the reliability prediction.
We have not provided an FMEA for the WOCS described in chapter 2, however, we have
discussed the main failures modes for the major components of the WOCS (see chapter 6). A
discussion like we presented in chapter 6 shall be carried out and the information shall be sum-
marized in an FMEA worksheet like in appendix B.
7.2.4 Step 4. To Estimate the TCFs
The information collected in the FMEA developed in the previous step is used to estimate the
TCFs. In chapter 4, we exemplified how to estimate the coverage factors for both the TCF and the
TCFmax for the SS-RAM. In the same way, we estimate TCF and TCFmax for the other components
used for fulfilment of the WOCS’s safety functions. In table (7.1) we present the estimated values
for TCF and TCFmax. In appendix D we present detailed calculations for the test coverage factors.
7.2.5 To Compute the PFDavg
The only parameter that is missing for the calculation for the PFDavg is the total failure rate
of the components. Assuming that the failure modes are disjoint, the total failure rate λDU of
the components is equal to the sum of the failure rates of its failure modes. In appendix E we
present detailed information of the failure modes and failure rate for the components. When
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Component
Total λDU
(·10−6)
TCF
(Partial Test)
TCFmax
(Full Test)
Safety
Functions
Pushbuttons 0.3 100% 100% PSD,ESD,EQD
Power Supply 39.93 100% 100% PSD,ESD,EQD
WOCS’s PLCs 4.94 100% 100% PSD,ESD,EQD
Pulse Operated
Solenoid Valve
7.01 100% 100% PSD
STWV 2 100% 100% PSD
Umbilical 3.6 100% 100% ESD,EQD
SS-RAM 46.44 64.3% 86.6% ESD,EQD
PIV 17.42 94.3% 100% ESD,EQD
CIV 0.22 86.0% 100% ESD,EQD
AIV 0.22 86.0% 100% ESD,EQD
XOV 0.22 86.0% 100% ESD,EQD
DHSV 3.2 80.5% 100% ESD,EQD
RRV 0.22 86.0% 100% EQD
RAIV 0.22 86.0% 100% EQD
Table 7.1: Summary of the Test Coverage Factors TCF and TCFmax, and failure rates for the com-
ponents used for fulfilment of the WOCS’s safety functions
some reliability data was not available (e.g., specific failure rate per failure modes), we assume
some values. The failure rates λDU are presented in table (7.1).
Figure (7.1) shows the saw curve - PFD(t), of the ESD function operating in normal mode
(without wireline or coiled tubing). The curve was computed for 700 hours, However the PFDavg
corresponds to 14 days (336 hours). Given that the SS-RAM is connected in parallel with other
components subject to perfect proof test every τ, the effect of imperfect proof test disappear (the
time dependent probability failure on demand is reduced to 0). In appendix E the reader can
find the code in MATLAB that was used to compute the PFDavg for the WOCS’s safety functions.
In table (7.2), we summarizes the results obtained to the PFDavg from the methods explained
in this report. For the WOCS there are components that are not perfectly tested, therefore, the
results from formulae derived from FTA should not be considered because the requirements of
this approach is that the proof tests are periodic and perfect. Nonetheless, if we assume that
the SS-RAM is no subject to imperfect proof test, we can use the formulae approach.
The results from the structure functions of the RBDs and from the continuous PFD(t) derived
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Figure 7.1: Saw curve (unavailability function) for the ESD function of the WOCS
Safety
Function
RBD / FTA
PSD 0.0045
ESD 0.0041
EDQ 0.0047
Table 7.2: Results to the PFDavg
from FTA are identical since the same formulas are used. In appendix G, we present the calcula-
tions of PFDavg for ESD WOCS’s safety function by using the formulae approach. We can notice
that the result is similar to the value computed by using the script developed in MATLAB. An im-
portant aspect of the computation of the PFDavg by using the formulae approach (based on the
minimal cut set theory) is that the component that are not redundant are the main contributors
to total PFDavg.
In chapter 8 we describe the major contributors to the total unavailability U¯ . The only con-
tributor considered for the WOCS is the PFDavg. The WOCS is available to function as a safety
system during the proof test, and if repairs take place during a proof test, there are other means
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to secure the well (e.g., the DHSV, Valves in the X-mas tree).
7.3 Comments and Discussion
The values computed for the PFDavg are not as small as we expected. The values indicate that the
SIL2 requirements are met. However, it is very important to take into account the assumptions
that were have made: amongst others, we have assumed, (i) normal mode of operation for the
ESD and EQD functions, meaning that most valves are redundant, (ii) the effect of imperfect
proof testing of the SS-RAM is null, and (iii) The RBDs are simplified. For example, there are
some subsystems like the workover control module and the high-pressure unit that should be
considered.
On the other hand, by adapting the policy of proof testing with short test intervals does not
necessarily mean that the system becomes highly reliable. The length of the test interval should
be selected by considering the major contributors to safety unavailability (see chapter 8), the
demand rate of hazardous events, redundancy, and, the reliability data.
Regarding to the demand rate, we recall the specified classification of demand modes of
operation (see e.g., section 3.5.16 IEC61508, 2010). Some authors argue that the specified dis-
tinction between low and high demand modes is arbitrary (Hokstad, 2014). We disagree with
that statement. The frequency of demand is a relevant parameter when defining the proper re-
liability measure. It is not reasonable to carry out too frequent testing to safety systems that are
seldom demanded, as well as, it is very risky to perform proof testing with long test intervals to
systems subject to high demand rate.
The WOCS is a system operating in low demand mode and it is subject to short test inter-
val. For the WOCS’s architecture that we have studied, some components are not redundant
and they have the highest failure rate compared with system’s components. from the table in
appendix G, we can see that those components have the highest probability of failure.
The PFDavg is the proper reliability measure when the effects of imperfect proof testing are
null or negligible. In addition, the PFDavg is properly used when the frequency of demand is
low (as specified by the IEC61508-4). When the demand rate is difficult to be established, other
reliability measure may be considered.
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In chapter 6 we discussed the effects of proof testing. It is reasonable to claim that the de-
veloping of control functions by safety systems should be considered as partial proof tests. This
argument is valid when that the physical stimulation as a result of the developing of the control
functions are between normal operating ranges.
Chapter 8
The Total Unavailability Function and the
Optimization Problem
8.1 Introduction
The reliability of a safety system is measured by the average unavailability between test intervals
(under the assumption that at the time instant of a full proof testing, the test is perfect). In
addition to the PFDavg, there are other contributors to the total unavailability of a system, that
also depend on the test interval τ. In this chapter, we present the major contributors to the
unavailability of a safety system.
We also show in this chapter that the total average unavailability which is function of τ (e.g.,
U¯ (τ)) has a minimum value. It means that we can select the proper length of the test interval
τ that leads to an average value of the unavailability that still meets the safety integrity require-
ments.
The starting point for selecting τ is the optimization of the unavailability function U¯ (τ).
8.2 Background
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) models based on fault tree analysis are widely used in the
industry, especially in the nuclear sector (NEA/CSNI/R, 2002). However, fault tree models can-
not incorporate some maintenance strategies, like staggered and sequential testing. Analytical
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formulae derived from fault tree analysis are suitable when the system is subject to periodic and
perfect proof testing. This is due to the static characteristic of the fault trees. Nonetheless, The
effect of partial proof test can also be incorporated in models derived from fault tree analysis, as
we have described in chapter 5.
The unavailability models derived from fault tree analysis only cover the PFDavg of the sys-
tem. A proper approach to include factors like testing time, repair time, human errors, un-
availability due to "on-demand" failures, is the use of analytical unavailability models because,
analytical formulae derived from fault tree analysis only consider the unavailability due to time
related failures. (see e.g., WS-Atkins, 1998)1.
The PDS method consider three major contributors to the unavailability: (i)the PFDavg
(ii)the unavailability due to testing and repair actions, and (iii) the probability of test indepen-
dent failures PTIF. In addition to this unavailability contributors, Chowhury and Varde (2011)
consider also the effect of human errors during testing and the effect of degradation/ageing of
the system component occurred during testing.
Similar approaches for determining the unavailability model can be found in the literature,
and the main objective of those articles is to optimize the analytical function in order to find the
optimal test interval. (see e.g., Lehtinen et al., 1984; Srinivas et al., 2012; WS-Atkins, 1998).
WS-Atkins (1998) develops a detailed analysis of major contributors to the unavailability of
stand-by systems (e.g. a safety system) in order to present a procedure to determine the optimal
test interval. Amongst the articles revised, WS-Atkins (1998) is the only author who consider the
implications of variation of the test intervals.
8.3 The Analytical Function and the Optimization Problem
Why should we optimize the analytical function for the test interval, when the reliability mea-
sure is constrained by recommendations on safety standards?. The optimization problem
should be addressed because (i)It allows us to be in the safe side from the analytical point of
view; (ii)as we show in further paragraphs, the unavailability is insensitive up to twice the opti-
mum test interval that leads to the minimum value of U¯ ; (iii)it helps to reduce too frequent proof
1This report can be accessed by direct request to the Health and Safety Executive organization
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testing by satisfying the risk criteria(e.g., average unavailability); and (iv)it allows to determine
an estimate of the minimum related cost.
Let us consider a single component. By combining the major contributors to the total un-
availability of a system, propose by Chowhury and Varde (see e.g., 2011); WS-Atkins (see e.g.,
1998); Hauge et al. (see e.g., 2013), the unavailability function is equal to the sum of the follow-
ing terms:
8.3.1 Average unavailability between test intervals
For one single component, the unavailability due to time related failures is given by the well-
known and often approximated quantity
PFDavg ≈ λDU ·τ
2
(8.1)
where λDU is the failure rate of hidden failures, and τ is test interval. We recall that this term
does not consider contributors to the unavailability like duration of the test, repair times, also
that tests or repairs will not leave the system in a failed state, and the failure rate is exponen-
tially distributed. Some methods for determining this unavailability for complex systems are
discussed in detail in chapter 5.
8.3.2 Average Unavailability due to testing time
This unavailability due to testing time, U¯t t is given by the fraction between the testing time(T)
and the total time between tests
U¯t t = T
τ
(8.2)
The reader can notice that this term corresponds to the downtime due to functional test-
ing/preventive maintenance presented in the PDS method(Hauge et al., 2013), when the op-
eration of the system continues without protection during the proof test.
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8.3.3 Average unavailability due to human errors
The unavailability due to human errors, U¯he , is proposed by (Chowhury and Varde, 2011) as
U¯he = Fh ·
T
τ
·N (8.3)
where Fh is the fraction of human errors (e.g., No. of failures due to humans / total No. of system
failures); the term T
τ
was presented in the previous subheading, and N denotes the number of
testing per year2 (e.g., total hours in a year(8760) / τ)
8.3.4 Unavailability due to on-demand failures at the beginning of the test
On-demand failures are failures that are independent of time and occur as a result of a demand
(WS-Atkins, 1998). For example, these failures are due to start-up loads. Consider for example
and open electric circuit. When the circuit closes for some reason, the demand of current may
cause that the power supply fails. In other words, during a start-up the component has a tran-
sition from a "cold" state to a "active" state. It is assumed that these kind of failures are found
at the beginning of a test, therefore, they are repaired immediately. The unavailability due to
on-demand failures is given by
U¯d =
Pd ·MRT
τ
(8.4)
where MRT denotes the mean repair time, and Pd is the probability of occurrence of this type of
failure. Since they are independent of time, a natural estimate of Pd is equal
N f
Nd
, where N f is the
number of failures recorded, and Nd is the number of system demands.
8.3.5 Unavailability due to failures during testing
If there failure modes that are introduced during the testing time with (active) failure rate λa ,
the unavailability due to this kind of failures is given by
U¯a = Pa ·MRT
τ
(8.5)
2For the WOCS, N should be computed for the operating time.
CHAPTER8. THETOTALUNAVAILABILITY FUNCTIONANDTHEOPTIMIZATIONPROBLEM67
where Pa is the probability of occurrence of λa . The probability Pa is given by λa ·T
8.4 The Analytical Function for the Total Unavailability
By assuming that the contributors to the total unavailability are independent, the combination
of the major contributors described from (Eq. (8.1) to Eq. (8.5)) lead to the following function
U¯T OT ≈ PFDavg+U¯t t +U¯d +U¯a (8.6)
U¯T OT ≈ λDU ·τ
2
+ 1
τ
· (T +Pd ·MRT +Pa ·MRT ) (8.7)
The reader can notice that the contributor due to human errors cannot be added since it is
not independent from the unavailability due to testing time. We omit to include this term by
assuming that its contribution is negligible.
We may also add the unavailability due to PT I F to the total unavailability in (8.7).
By optimizing 8.7 with respect to τ (e.g., d(U¯ (τ)dτ = 0), τ becomes
τopt =
√
4 ·ρ
λDU
(8.8)
where
ρ = T +Pd ·MRT +Pa ·MRT (8.9)
τopt in 8.8 is similar to the result obtained by (Vaurio, 1995). According to (Vaurio, 1995), τopt
derived from the unavailability function (e.g., (8.7)) should not be used as the only criterion for
selecting the frequency of testing.
As mentioned, the average unavailability is insensitive to the test interval from approxi-
mately τopt /2 to 2 ·τopt , therefore, it is acceptable to select the maximum t∗opt = 2 · topt as the
optimum test interval. This is easily understood by analysing the resulting curve from (8.7).
Figure (8.1) was constructed by assuming a failure rate λ = 4x10−6[hour ]−1, ρ = 12hour s.
Hence, τopt ≈ 3460hour s. The data in the figure (8.1) shows the value of U¯ is very similar in the
interval τopt /2 to 2 ·τopt . As mentioned, by finding the optimum test from the average unavail-
ability function, it allow us to estimate the minimum related cost. The total cost per time unit
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Figure 8.1: The unavailability function when considering all major contributors
for system with constant failure rate and safety functions is given by (Vatn, 2013)
C (τ)= CP
τ
+CR ·
(
λDU −
λ2DU τ
2
)
+CH λDUτ
2
fD (8.10)
where CP is the preventive maintenance cost due to the proof test and CR concerns to repair
related cost (corrective maintenance costs) and CH indicates the hazard related costs, and fD
corresponds to the rate of undetected demands(Vatn, 2007).
The minimum estimated cost can be found by inserting (8.8) into 8.10. Figure (8.2) illustrates
the relationship between the average unavailability function, the cost function and the optimum
test interval.
The estimation of the hazard relates cost is a challenge. The impact of hazardous events may
be catastrophic and the magnitude of the consequences are not possible to estimate accurately.
The optimization problem may also be solved by the use of advanced computer algorithms
like genetic algorithm(GA)3 or Monte Carlo Simulation. According to Chowhury and Varde
(2011), if the problem encircles multiple objectives (e.g., unavailability, cost, production), the
implementation of a GA is a good technique because its flexibility and robustness.
3Genetic algorithms are computational tools founded on a direct analogy with the physical evolution of species
(Goldberg,1989)
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Figure 8.2: Optimal test frequency of proof test by minimizing the unavailability function and
the cost function
When reliability data is not available, the expert’s judgment seems to be the best approach.
For example, Abrahamsen and Røed (2012) present a framework for selection of the test method
and test interval for safety critical valves with limited reliability data.
Chapter 9
Summary, Conclusions and Further Work
9.1 Summary and Conclusions
We found that little work has been done on mathematical models for modelling the effects of
short test intervals. This topic is barely discussed in the information available. When the length
of the test interval is short and it has negative impacts to the system’s reliability, the problem is
addressed by optimizing the unavailability function that depends on the test interval τ.
The optimization problem requires the analysis of the major contributors to safety unavail-
ability. Amongst these contributors, the PFDavg, unavailability due to testing time, unavailability
due to human errors, unavailability due to failures introduced during proof tests, are taken into
account.
When considering the effect of imperfect and partial proof testing, two main approaches are
available: (i) the use the test coverage factor and (ii) and the addition of a constant contribution
to the safety unavailability in order to compensate failures that are not revealed by a proof test.
In both cases, a perfect proof test takes place at the time instant of the full proof test.
It is recognized that the reliability of a system is a function of the test interval τ and the
failure rate λ. In theory, short test intervals and low failure rate lead to high reliability (e.g., low
PFDavg). This is true if the proof test does not contribute to unnecessary wear, degradation or
deterioration of the components and introduction of failures due to human interaction.
High reliability also depends on the reliability considerations during the all design phases of
the system. In order to build high reliability into the system, a well-defined reliability engineer-
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ing programme should consider amongst other factors, understanding of the failure modes of
the system, the required satisfactory performance (e.g., the target reliability measure), redun-
dancy, the operating environment and conditions, the life time of the system and the mainte-
nance policy.
The FMEA becomes a design tool that allows to system designers, operators and mainte-
nance personnel to identify potential system weaknesses in order to do modifications during
early design phases, establish good operating and maintenance practices and policies.
We discussed four methods for the reliability assessment of the WOCS. As a support to the
reliability assessment, the main components of a WOCS were described; its operational and
maintenance philosophy were discussed with personnel with experience in this matter, and the
outcome was include as part of the description of the system. This description allowed us to
describe the safety functions of the WOCS. The RBDs derived from the description of the safety
functions were used for reliability calculations.
The models available when modelling the effect of imperfect proof test do not consider ran-
dom hardware failures that are never revealed by a proof test. This kind of failures lead to an
increasing unavailability over the time. We introduced the concept of a maximum coverage fac-
tor (TFCmax) that in conjunction with the generally accepted proof test coverage factor(that we
have called TCF), we proposed a mathematical expression that models the effect of both partial
proof tests and imperfect proof tests due to random hardware failures. The model is derived
under the assumption that the failure rate is exponentially distributed.
Taking into account the proposed model, the methods discussed for the reliability assess-
ment (e.g., computation of the PFDavg) were: (i)the structure function of a RBD, (ii)simplified
formulae derived from fault tree analysis, (iii) time dependent unavailability by using Fault Trees
and (iv)Petri Net models. With exception of (ii), the methods consider the use of the both the
TCF and TCFmax.
An algorithm in MATLAB was developed for the use of the methods (i) and (iii), the package
GRIF was used for simulating the Petri Net models proposed in this master’s thesis and Microsoft
Excelr spreadsheets were used to compute the simplified formulae.
The simplified formulae approach is not a proper technique when the system is subject to
imperfect proof testing. In this case, we recommend to use the proposed model (the mathe-
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matical expression for the time dependent availability) which gives an exact solution for PDFavg
calculations. The proposed Petri Nets models give very similar results when we simulate a single
component subject to perfect, partial or imperfect proof tests. It was not possible to simulate
the Petri Net models driven by RBDs, because the package GRIF did not follow the logic for
computing the average unavailability.
A simplified procedure for the estimation of the coverage factors was proposed. It is based
on the outcomes of an FMEA, therefore, realistic results for both TCF and TCFmax depend on a
targeted and exhaustive FMEA. We estimated these coverage factors for all components required
for fulfilment of the safety functions of the WOCS. However, limited information about the fail-
ure rate per failure modes can be found in the databases. This information is especially limited
for equipment used for drilling and WO than for topside side equipment. Therefore, the cover-
age factor presented for the components involved in the development of the safety functions,
possibly might not be as accurate as preferred.
When a component is a single point of system’s failure, and this component is subject to
imperfect proof tests, the PFDavg should carefully be considered as the reliability measure of
safety related system because it increases over time. In fact, in this situation, any reliability
measure changes towards a low reliability(e.g., the frequency of failure increases, the mean time
between failures reduces, and so on). When the system has redundant components, (especially
when the redundant channels are > 3), the contribution to the unavailability is considerable
small if only one channel (e.g., 1oo3) is required to fulfil the safety function.
The computations of the PFDavg for the safety functions of the WOCS fulfil the SIL 2 require-
ments as described in the standard IEC61508. The main aspects that leads to a constant PFDavg
over the time are: (i) It is assumed that perfect proof tests take place, (ii) despite the fact that the
SS-RAM is subject to imperfect proof test, it has redundant final elements that are assumed to
be perfectly tested, (iii) for the EQD function, it is assumed that decoupling action of the marine
riser from the lower riser package functions perfectly, (iv) the PFDavg calculations for the ESD
and EQD functions correspond to the normal mode, when the production line is not obstructed
with running tools and most valves are redundant, and (v) we used simplified RBDs.
We conclude that the PFDavg is the proper reliability measure when the effects of imperfect
proof testing are null or negligible. In addition, the PFDavg is properly used when the frequency
CHAPTER 9. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHERWORK 73
of demand is low. When the demand rate is difficult to be establish, other reliability measure
may be considered.
We also conclude that it is reasonable to claim that the developing of control functions by
safety systems should be considered as partial proof tests. This argument is valid when that the
physical stimulation as a result of the developing of the control functions are between normal
operating ranges.
Finally, the average unavailability of a safety system should not only consider the PFDavg. We
discussed most of the contributors to the total unavailability, and a mathematical expression for
the total average unavailability was derived. This function was used to exemplify how to find the
optimal test interval and to estimate the minimal related cost. This approach is relevant, when
the safety system is unavailable during the testing time.
9.2 Further Work
Reliability data is the cornerstone for the estimation of the coverage factors. Proper reliability
data gathering methods or process should be enhanced.
Exhaustive description of the failure modes of the components involved in the development
of the WOCS’s safety functions need to be examined. It is strongly related with the process of
gathering reliability data.
Generalization of a model for computation of the PFDavg of koon architecture by using the
proposed model for computing the time dependent availability is recommended.
A research for defining a new reliability measure when is not possible to distinguish between
low and high demand modes of operation is required.
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Appendix A
Equipment Controlled by the WOCS
In the following table, the typical modules controlled by the WOCS are listed. In the next two
pages, the typical general arrangement of the main components of C/WO riser systems for the
operational modes(tubing hanger mode and tree mode) are presented.
Table A.1: Typical modules controlled by the WOCS. Adapted from (ISO13628, 2005b)
Tubing hanger mode Tree mode
Surface flow tree Surface flow tree
Lubricator valve Lubricator valve
Retainer valve Retainer Valve
Subsea test tree Emergency disconnect package
Tubing hanger running tool WCT-BOP
Tubing hanger Tree running tool
Tree cap running tool Subsea tree
Internal tree cap Internal tree cap
Subsea tree
Downhole monitoring and
flow control functions
Downhole monitoring and
flow control functions
SCSSV
SCSSV -
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 Key 
1 top drive 
2 drill sub 
3 surface-tree tension frame 
4 coiled tubing injector 
5 roller bushing 
6 surface BOP 
7 surface tree 
8 surface-tree adapter joint 
9 umbilical (to hose reel) 
10 drill floor 
11 slick (cased wear) joint 
12 moon pool area 
13 riser tension wires 
14 tension joint 
15 standard riser joints 
16 stress joint 
17 wellhead 
18 emergency disconnect package 
19 guide base 
20 lower riser package 
21 subsea tree 
22 seabed 
Typical C/WO riser general arrangement  Tree mode 
  
Key 
1 top drive 
2 drill sub 
3 surface-tree tension frame 
4 surface equipment 
5 diverter 
6 surface tree 
7 umbilical (to hose reel) 
8 slick joint 
9 drill floor 
10 ball joint 
11 moon pool area 
12 telescopic joint 
13 riser tension wires 
14 drilling riser joints 
15 standard C/WO riser joints 
16 wellhead 
17 flex-joint 
18 guide base 
19 LMRP 
20 seabed 
21 BOP 
 Typical C/WO riser general arrangement  Tubing hanger mode 
Appendix B
Example of an FMEA Worksheet
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Appendix C
MATLAB Code
The code developed in MATLAB consists of four subroutines. The subroutine Availability.c com-
putes the time dependent availability. In other words it computes
Ak (t )= e−T C F ·λ·(t−τp j ,i )e−(T C Fm−TC F )·λ·(t−τi )e−(1−TC Fm )·λ·t (C.1)
The code follows
function [Aoft]=Availability(LT,m,Tau,Lambda,TCFm,TCFp)
t=0:1:LT; % Definition of the period of interest (lifetime)
[TauVector TparVector]=Tests(LT,m,Tau); %Computation of instant time of
%full and partial proof tests
%for periodic proof tests.
%Determination of failure rates
l1=TCFp*Lambda;
l2=(TCFm-TCFp)*Lambda;
l3=(1-TCFm)*Lambda;
tp=TparVector;
tf=TauVector;
j=1;
i=1;
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r=zeros(size(t));
k=1;
%Computation of time dependent unavailability for a single component
while t(k) < LT
if t(k) <= TauVector(i+1)
if t(k) <= TparVector(j+1)
r(k)=exp(-l1*(t(k)-tp(j))).*exp(-l2*(t(k)-tf(i))).*exp(-l3*t(k));
k=k+1;
else
j=j+1;
end
else
i=i+1;
end
end
Aoft=r(1:LT); %time dependent availability for a single component
end
Notice that the code Availability.c calls the function Test.c. The code for Test.c follows
function [TauVector TparVector]=Tests(LT,m,Tau);
nfpt=ceil(LT/Tau);
TparVecTemp=zeros(1,2);
TauVector=zeros(1,2);
lppt=round(Tau/m);
nppt=ceil(LT/lppt);
%Determine instant time of periodic partial proof tests
for y=2:nppt+2
if TparVecTemp(end) < LT
TparVecTemp(y)= TparVecTemp(y-1)+ lppt;
else
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end
end
TparVector=TparVecTemp(1,1:end);
%Determine the instant time of periodic full proof tests (Tau vector)
for y=2:nfpt+2
TauVector(y)= TauVector(y-1)+ Tau;
end
TauVector;
end
The code for computation of
RS(t )=
n∏
k=1
Rk (t ) For series systems (C.2)
can be found by using the subroutine Series.c. The code for Series.c follows
function [PFDseries]=Series(varargin)
PFDseries=varargin{1};
if nargin > 1
for n = 2:nargin
PFDseries=PFDseries.*varargin{n};
end
end
end
The code for computation of
RP (t )= 1−
n∏
k=1
(1−Rk (t )) For parallel systems (C.3)
can be found by using the subroutine Parallel.c. The code Follows
function [PFDparallel]=Parallel(varargin)
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if nargin > 1
y=(1-varargin{1}).*(1-varargin{2});
for n = 2:nargin-1
y=y.*(1-varargin{n+1});
end
end
PFDparallel=1-y;
end
Appendix D
Reduced Petri Net
Perfect Full Proof Test and Partial Proof Tests
In this Petri Net, the place p1 from figure (5.10) has two tokens to indicate that there are two
types of hidden failures. One type revealed by partial proof tests and another type revealed by
full proof tests. The Petri net in figure (D.1) has two places (p4 and p10) to denote that a failure
event with failure rate equal to λPDU = TC F ·λDU or λFDU = (1−TC F ) ·λDU may occur. The total
failure rate of the component is equal to λDU = λPDU +λFDU . Notice that we assume that the
failure events are independent.
After a failure event due to λPDU , the transition t1 is fired and a token is released to place p4.
Similarly, after a failure event due to λFDU (hidden failures only revealed by full proof tests), the
transition t6 is fired and a token is released to place p10.
When a partial proof test takes place (the transition t2 has been fired) a token is present in
place p5, therefore, if there is a hidden failure due to λPDU , transition t4 is fired; or, if there is no
hidden failures due to λPDU , the transition t5 is fired. Nonetheless, a token is released to place
p8. Transitions t8a and t8b are constrained by the predicates F1∪F2 = tr ue and F1∩F2 = f al se,
respectively. At this point, a decision is made whereas repair actions take place or a new testing
interval starts. The variables F1 and F2 are used to indicate if a failure has occurred and repair
actions should take place. For example, F1 and F2 are set to true when hidden failures has been
revealed. See transitions t4 and t10 in figure (D.1).
When the transition t2 is fired a token is also released to place p9. However, transition t9 or
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t10 is not fired until the number of tokens in place p9 are equal to m, meaning that a full proof
test is taking place; If hidden failure occurs due to λFDU (represented by a token in place p10), the
variable F2 is set to true and repair actions take place, because the predicate in transition t8a is
met.
After repair actions, transitions t11a and/or t3a are fired if and only if failures due to λPDU
and λFDU had occurred, respectively; otherwise, the tokens in places p4 and p3 are removed
through transitions t11b or t3b avoiding the increase of the number of tokens in places p1. The
decision taken in transitions t11b and t3b are constrained if failures have occurred. For example,
the variable F1 is set to true when a hidden failure due to λPDU is revealed and set to false after a
repair.
The variable OF1 = tr ue is used to indicate that a failure due toλPDU has occurred and transi-
tion t1 cannot be fired until the variable is set to false after a repair. In the same way, the variable
OF2 = tr ue is used to indicate that a failure due to λFDU has occurred and transition t6 cannot
be fired until the variable is set to false after a repair.
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Figure D.1: Petri Net for modelling Periodic perfect full proof tests and m−1 partial proof tests
in the test interval of full proof tests. (Reduced Model)
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Figure D.2: Example of Petri Net driven by RBD
Appendix E
Calculation of TCF and TCFmax
In the next table we present the calculation of the TCF and TCFmax by using the method pro-
posed in chapter 4. The failure rate is in the order of 10−6.
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SS-RAM F. Rate Weight 
TCF p / 
F.R 
TCF p 
TCF f / 
F.R 
TCF F Data source 
Fail to Close 8.02 0.173 1 
0.643 
1 
0.866 
Oreda Subsea 
Equipment (2009). 
p125 
Fail to Shear 6.2 0.134 0 0 
Fail to Open 8.02 0.173 1 1 
Internal Leakage 18 0.388 0.7 1 
External Leakage 6.2 0.134 0.2 1 
  
PIV 
F. Rate Weight 
TCF p / 
F.R 
TCF p 
TCF f 
/F.R 
TCF F Data Source 
Fail to Close 8.02 0.460 1 
0.943 
1 
1 
Oreda Subsea 
Equipment (2009). 
p111 
Fail to Open 8.02 0.460 1 1 
Internal Leakage 0.99 0.057 0 1 
External Leakage 0.39 0.022 1 1 
  
CIV, XOV, AIV,RAIV, RRV F. Rate Weight 
TCF p / 
F.R 
TCF p 
TCF f 
/F.R 
TCF F Data Source 
Fail to Close 0.077 0.350 1 
0.860 
1 
1 
PDS Method 
Data Handbook 
(2013). 
p118 
Fail to Open 0.077 0.350 1 1 
Internal Leakage 0.044 0.200 0.7 1 
External Leakage 0.022 0.100 0.2 1 
  
DHSV F. Rate Weight 
TCF p / 
F.R 
TCF p 
TCF f 
/F.R 
TCF F Data Source 
Fail to Close 0.96 0.300 1 
0.805 
1 
1 
PDS Method 
Data Handbook 
(2013). 
p113 
Fail to Open 0.96 0.300 1 1 
Internal Leakage 0.8 0.250 0.7 1 
External Leakage 0.48 0.150 0.2 1 
        Component F. Rate Data Source 
Power Unit 39.93 Oreda. Topside Equipment(2009), p83 
Pushbutton 0.3 PDS Method - Data Handook(2013), p73 
PLC 4.94 PDS Method - Data Handook(2013), p79,80,81 
Umbillical 3.6 Oreda. Subsea Equipment(2009), p83 
STWV 7.01 PDS Method - Data Handook (2006), Table 5 
 
Appendix F
Commands in MATLAB for Computing the
PFDavg
clear
clc
Tau=336; %It is equivalent to 14 days
m=2; %Number of proof tests in a test interval Tau
LT=700; %Life time in hours
% Subsystem RS1: Pushbuttons in an architecture 1oo2
Lambda=0.3/1000000; %Failure Rate
TCFm=1; % Maximum test coverage factor
TCFp=1; % Patial test coverage factor
s1=Availability(LT,m,Tau,Lambda,TCFm,TCFp); % Solution of Eq. 5.3
RS1=Parallel(s1,s1); % Solution of Eq. 5.2
% Subsystem RS2: Power Supply, WOCS's PLC and Umbillical in series.
Lambda=48.47/1000000; %Failure Rate = 39.93+4.94+3.6
TCFm=1; % Maximum test coverage factor
TCFp=1; % Patial test coverage factor
s2=Availability(LT,m,Tau,Lambda,TCFm,TCFp); % Solution of Eq. 5.3
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RS2=Series(1,s2); % Solution of Eq. 5.1
% Subsystem RS3: SS-RAM.
Lambda=46.44/1000000; %Failure Rate
TCFm=0.866; % Maximum test coverage factor
TCFp=0.643; % Patial test coverage factor
s3=Availability(LT,m,Tau,Lambda,TCFm,TCFp); % Solution of Eq. 5.3
RS3=Series(1,s3); % Solution of Eq. 5.1
%Subsystems RS4: Valves CIV, or AIV in an architecture 1oo2 .
Lambda=0.22/1000000; %Failure Rate
TCFm=1; % Maximum test coverage factor
TCFp=0.86; % Patial test coverage factor
s4=Availability(LT,m,Tau,Lambda,TCFm,TCFp); % Solution of Eq. 5.3
RS4=Parallel(s4,s4); % Solution of Eq. 5.2
%Subsystem RS5: PIV.
Lambda=17.42/1000000; %Failure Rate
TCFm=1; % Maximum test coverage factor
TCFp=0.943; % Patial test coverage factor
s5=Availability(LT,m,Tau,Lambda,TCFm,TCFp); % Solution of Eq. 5.3
RS5=Series(1,s5); % Solution of Eq. 5.1
%Subsystem RS6: DHSV.
Lambda=3.2/1000000; %Failure Rate
TCFm=1; % Maximum test coverage factor
TCFp=0.805; % Patial test coverage factor
s6=Availability(LT,m,Tau,Lambda,TCFm,TCFp); % Solution of Eq. 5.3
RS6=Series(1,s6); % Solution of Eq. 5.2
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% Subsystem RS7 corresponds to RS5 (PIV) in series with RS4 (1oo2 CIV)
RS7=Series(RS5,RS4); % Solution of Eq. 5.1
% Subsystem RS8 corresponds to RS3 (SS-RAM) in Parallel with RS7
RS8=Parallel(RS3,RS7); % Solution of Eq. 5.2
%Subsystems RS9: Valves XOV in an architecture 1oo3 .
Lambda=0.22/1000000; %Failure Rate
TCFm=1; % Maximum test coverage factor
TCFp=0.86; % Patial test coverage factor
s9=Availability(LT,m,Tau,Lambda,TCFm,TCFp); % Solution of Eq. 5.3
RS9=Parallel(s9,s9,s9); % Solution of Eq. 5.2
% Subsystem RS10 corresponds to RS8 in series with RS4 (1oo2 AIV)
%in series with RS9 (1oo3 XOV)
RS10=Series(RS8,RS4,RS9); % Solution of Eq. 5.1
%Subsystem RS11 corresponds to RS10 in parallel with RS6 (DHSV)
RS11=Parallel(RS10,RS6); % Solution of Eq. 5.2
%The total system corresponds to RS1 (pushbutton) in series with RS2 (Power
%Supply, WOCS's PLC and Umbillical) in series with RS11
RST=Series(RS1,RS2,RS11); % Solution of Eq. 5.1
%The time dependent Unavailability for the safety function ESD
AESD=1-RST;
S=AESD(1:Tau);
PFDavg=mean(S)
Appendix G
Calculation of PFDavg by using the Formulae
Approach
In the figure, we present the computation of the PFDavg by using
Qo ≈
r∑
i=1
Qˇi ≈ 2
n
n+1 ·
n∏
j=1
q¯ j (G.1)
where
q¯ j ≈
λ j ·TC F j ·τp
2
+ λ j · (1−TC F j ) ·τ
2
(G.2)
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Minimal Cut Sets  
 
Components 
Failure 
Rate 
TCFp TCFmax qp qf 
Tau-
partial t 
Tau-full 
test. 
Pushbuttons 8.4672E-10 Pushbuttons 3E-07 1 1 2.52E-05 0 168 336 
Power supply 0.00335412 Power supply 3.99E-05 1 1 0.003354 0 168 336 
WOCS's PLCs 0.00041496 WOCS's PLCs 4.94E-06 1 1 0.000415 0 168 336 
Umbilical 0.0003024 Umbilical 3.6E-06 1 1 0.000302 0 168 336 
SS-RAM, PIV,DHSV 5.25751E-09 SS-RAM 4.64E-05 0.643411 1 0.00251 0.002782 168 336 
SS-RAM, 
CIVs(1oo2), DHSV 
2.41424E-15 PIV 1.74E-05 0.943169 1 0.00138 0.000166 168 336 
AIVs(1oo2),DHSV 2.85129E-13 AIV 2.2E-07 0.86 1 1.59E-05 5.17E-06 168 336 
XOVs(1oo3), DHSV 9.61098E-18 XOV 2.2E-07 0.86 1 1.59E-05 5.17E-06 168 336 
  
CIV 2.2E-07 0.86 1 1.59E-05 5.17E-06 168 336 
  
DHSV 3.2E-06 0.805 1 0.000216 0.000105 168 336 
          
           
 = 0.0040714 =PDFavg 
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Preface
This report is intended to produce an overview and acting as a management tool towards con-
trolling the progress of the master thesis "Methods for determining PFD/SIL for workover con-
trol systems with short test-intervals and imperfect testing".
I thank you in advance to Professor Mary Ann Lundteige and, to Stein Hauge, senior scientist
at SINTEF, for their academic and technical guidance during this master thesis.
The pre-Study report has been carried out by stud. Techn. Wilmer Alberto Aguilar Martinez,
International Master Student in Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS), at
the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU).
Trondheim, 2014-01-27
Wilmer Alberto Aguilar Martínez
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Problem Description
Systems like workover control systems (WOCS) are used to shut down the operation safely while
doing well intervention and well maintenance. Due to the role as safety barriers, it is neces-
sary to demonstrate the SIL performance according to standards like IEC61508 and IEC61511.
WOCS may be out of service for longer periods, then in operation for a shorter or longer period
depending on the well maintenance program. The systems are frequently tested while in oper-
ation and they are always functionally tested just prior to each operation (and must be retrieved
and re-tested if operation lasts too long).
Standard calculation techniques for determining SIL performance result in very low average
probability of failure on demand(PFDavg) estimates, and it has been questioned if these results
are reasonable. The PFDavg is reduced even further if aspects such as imperfect test are not
incorporated in the calculations.
Objectives
The main objective of the master thesis is to suggest a new or alternative approaches for how to
determine and evaluate the PFDavg/SIL for safety critical systems with short test intervals and
non—perfect testing, using the WOCS as a case study. More specific objectives are:
1. Present a description of WOCS including architecture design, applications, functional re-
quirements, analysis of the operational and maintenance philosophy, overview of guide-
lines and standards.
2. Perform and document a literature study of approaches for reliability assessment of
WOCS.
3. Establish the methods available for reliability analysis of WOCS highlighting the under-
lying assumptions and influencing factors leading to high/low reliability measures and
taking into account the effect of non-perfect prof tests and short test intervals.
4. Present a stepwise procedure for estimating the test coverage factor for modelling the ef-
fect of imperfect/partial proof tests.
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5. Present a discussion of the impact in the reliability measures of the fact that WOCS per-
form safety and control functions.
Methodology
This section describes the methodology to be applied during the development of this project. It
is composed of the phases described in the following paragraphs.
Phase 1. Literature Review
The first phase of this master thesis is to study relevant information in the standards that govern
safety-critical systems. The standards (IEC61508, 2010) and (IEC61511, 2003) are the primary
source of information to functional safety. The guidelines OLF-070, application of the two stan-
dards IEC in the Norwegian petroleum industry is also a primary reference.
An overview of workover control systems can be found in the standard (ISO13628, 2005b),
design and operation of subsea production systems: Completion/workover riser systems.
The guidelines (ISO/TR-12489, 2013), reliability modelling and calculation of safety sys-
tems, is the main document to study the techniques that are applicable for reliability analysis of
WOCS.
Information available at the Department of Safety Research, SINTEF, is also of paramount
importance for the developing of this master thesis.
The process for collecting scientific information regarding to this master thesis is mainly
based on the database Scopus, Elsevier, Google scholar, Onepetro and IEEE Xplore.
Phase 2. Design
Based on the literature review and analysis of previous work on reliability assessment of WOCS,
alternative methods for determining the PFDavg/SIL of WOCS are to be proposed. The tech-
niques considered in the first instance are listed below. The techniques are not limited or bound
to the analysis.
• Reliability Block Diagrams / Fault tree analysis
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• Multi-phase Markov Models
• Mathematical expressions
• Petri Nets
Phase 3. Implementation and Test
The technique(s) chose in phase 2 is(are) implemented and tested for reliability assessment of
WOCS. The results shall be compared, advantages and disadvantages shall be highlighted. Re-
markable conclusions should be drawn.
Phase 4. Writing the Report
This is the final phase of this project. The results will be presented in a structured and scientific
manner. The initial content of the final report includes.
• Introduction
• Modelling imperfect proof tests
• WOCS description
• Models for reliability assessment of WOCS
• Summary and conclusions
• Further work
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1 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING  
2 
From August 2012  to June  
2014 
Master of Science in Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety 
(RAMS) 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway 
 Master Thesis 
Methods for determining PFD/SIL for workover control systems with short test intervals 
and imperfect testing 
 Project Thesis 
Reliability Assessment of Safety-Instrumented Systems with Imperfect Proof-Testing 
The report is available as an additional reading to chapter 11 of the latest book written 
by professor Marvin Rausand, at http://www.ntnu.edu/web/ross/books/sis/chapt11 
 Principal subjects 
Reliability and Safety Analysis, Maintenance Management, Risk Analysis, Risks in 
Project Management, Lifetime Analysis, Applied Statistics, RAMS Engineering and 
Management, RAMS Optimization. 
 Additional Courses 
Subsea Production Systems, Robotics, Industrial Systems Engineering 
  
From August 1996 to April 
2004 
Bachelor in Electronics Engineering  
Universidad Francisco de Paula Santander, Cúcuta, Colombia 
 
  Project Thesis 
Design and  implementation of a system for monitoring and data acquisition of 
operating parameters of the pump stations of pipeline Caño Limon Coveñas, Colombia 
 Professional Profile 
 Able to design, analyse, implement, adapt, configure, test, operate and perform 
maintenance of electronic systems in areas of instrumentation and control systems. 
Able to identify, formulate and solve engineering problems efficiently. 
3 
WORK EXPERIENCE  
4 
From July 2011  to July 2012 Maintenance Inspector Engineer at  SERINGTEC S.A.S, Cúcuta, Colombia 
www.seringtec.com 
Sector  Oil and Gas 
Seringtec SAS provides consultancy and EPC services in Colombia for the oil and gas 
industry.   
Main Responsibilities  To establish technical specifications of field instrumentation in the Optimization Project 
of the pipeline Caño Limón Coveñas, Colombia. 
 To assist in writing pump station operation & maintenance manuals for the pipeline 
Caño Limón Coveñas, Colombia. 
  
From April 2010  to December 
2010 
Engineer II at   TECNICONTROL S.A. Bogotá, Colombia  
www.tecnicontrol.com.co 
Sector  Oil and Gas 
Tecnicontrol SA provides consultancy and EPC services in Latin America. Tecnicontrol 
SA covers mainly the market segment of the oil and gas, mining and construction 
industry.   
Main Responsibilities  To establish technical specifications of field instrumentation and control systems for the 
onshore facilities of Ecopetrol Coveñas ODC-ACN, Colombia. 
  
From April 2005 to  April 2010 Technical Engineer at   CONSORCIO ICAMEX-TERMOTECNICA. Cúcuta, Colombia 
Sector  Oil and Gas 
Consortium ICAMEX-Termotecnica provided outsourcing services for maintenance of 
pump stations and pipelines in Colombia 
Main Responsibilities  To supervise maintenance development of field instrumentation and control systems of 
the onshore facilities - Coveñas ODC-ACN, Colombia 
Wilmer Alberto Aguilar Martinez 
 Block 22, Room 51, Moholt Alle, Trondheim, 7050, Norway  +47  45174797, +57 316 454 21 55 
  wilmeraa@stud.ntnu.no,  ing_wil@hotmail.com          
 
Skype: wilmer.aguilar3 
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5 
 
PERSONAL SKILLS  
6 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION  
  
Additional Training  Introduction to Systems Engineering, www.coursera.org , April 2014 to June 2014 
MOOC developed by the University of New South Wales, Australia 
Seminars 
 
 
 Functional Safety, Gas ATEX Risk Management, SIS for Gas ATEX Protection, leaded  
by Risknowlogy, November 28-30,2011 Bogota, Colombia, 
 Best Measurement Practices by FMCTechnologies,  April 2008, Bogota Colombia, 
Honours 
 
 
 Best ECAES 2003 – Electronics Engineering – Universidad Francisco de Paula 
Santander, Cúcuta, Colombia. 
 Leader HSE, Consorcio ICAMEX-TERMOTECNICA, 2008, Coveñas ODC-ACN, 
Colombia 
Reference(s) 
Work Experience  Certificate(s) 
 It will be provided on request 
 It will be provided on request 
 
Languages skills Mother tongue:  Spanish 
 Other language:  English Self-Assessment: Proficient User 
  Norwegian Self-Assessment: Beginner 
 Communication skills  I express myself clearly and positively, both verbally and in writing; Communications skills 
gained through dynamic participation in different events in my previous jobs. 
  Organisational /   Managerial 
skills 
 Leadership: Responsible for maintenance team of control system and instrumentation in 
Coveñas ODC-ACN. Skill reinforced during the course Experts in Team at NTNU. 
 Cooperation and Commitment: Member of interdisciplinary teams responsible for 
maintenance development and projects execution. 
 Planning and scheduling: Management of Work Orders in Coveñas ODC-CAN. 
 Setting and maintaining performance of standards: Responsible for documentation 
management required by the certification ISO 9001:2008 of plant Coveñas ODC-CAN in 
the area of control and instrumentation. 
 Good time Management  
 Know how to prioritize: As a member of the maintenance crew, I was responsible for 
making decision on prioritizing maintenance tasks. 
  
Job-related and Technical 
skills 
 To assist in Layer Protection Analysis (LOPA), Hazardous and Operability Studies 
(HAZOP), SIL assessment, Safety and Requirements Specifications (SRS). Skills 
learned during the FS workshops leaded by Risknowlogy in Coveñas and Bogota, 
Colombia. 
 To develop control strategies for Basic Process Control Systems such as DCS ABB, and 
implement new product technologies as well. Skill acquired during my job at Consortium 
Icamex-Termotécnica.  
 To follow standards and procedures. Core skill learned in previous jobs 
  
Computer skills  Good command of Microsoft OS™ and Microsoft Office™ tools 
 Good command of Minitab, CARA, MATLAB, LaTex 
 Basic command of Visual Basic 2010 
